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INTRODUCTION

Financial disclosure laws are among the most important regulations
affecting judges, and are perhaps the most helpful in exposing potentially harmful conflicts of interest.' Such laws exist in one form or
another in forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
system. 2 To date no national studies have compared and analyzed their
requirements. This article seeks to fill that void.
1. In the past decade considerable public attention has been focused on the conduct of
judges, and particularly upon conflicts of interest and questionable financial dealings. Major
investigations have probed alleged improprieties in many courts. Sullivan, Policing Bench and
Bar, 16 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 433 (1985); Tamarkin, The Judge Wore a Wire: OperationGreylord,
70 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1984, at 76 (investigation of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois);
Biddle, Above the Law, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15-17, 1983 (reprint) (investigation of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court); Bissinger & Biddle, Disorderin the Court, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Jan. 24-31 (1986) (investigation of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas). The nomination
of William H. Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the United States brought forward a lengthy probe
into his background and property holdings and expressions of concern over possible conflicts of
interest. S. REP. No. 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, 70, 77-82, 90-99, 108-13 (1986) (dissenting
views of Senators Biden, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, and Leahy).
These events underscore the importance of the governing provisions in constitutions, statutes,
court rules, and codes of ethics that regulate judicial conduct and ethics. These provisions are
intended to increase judges' observance of high moral and ethical standards and to prevent and
expose potential conflicts of interest. Although the public may be aware of scandals involving
alleged judicial corruption, most citizens tend to be unaware of the existence of judicial codes
and financial disclosure laws, let alone their specific requirements.
2. Idaho, Louisiana, and Utah do not require financial disclosure. See infra Table 1. South
Dakota has a provision in its Code of Judicial Conduct that requires disclosure, although the
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For this article we collected and analyzed all of the provisions in constitutions, statutes, court rules, administrative orders, and codes
of ethics - that require financial disclosure by judges. We also sent
a questionnaire to the court administration office in each jurisdiction
requesting information about the authority for disclosure, the identity
of the judges and family members to whom disclosure is applied, the
place and frequency of filing disclosure reports, the penalties for nondisclosure, and the sources of income and nature of activities that
must be disclosed. 3 Finally, we requested copies of governing provisions and actual disclosure forms.
We received responses to the questionnaire from all but one of the
jurisdictions surveyed. 4 Twenty-eight jurisdictions also provided copies
of their disclosure forms. 5 All of the governing provisions and data
from all of the questionnaires were plotted on tables that illustrate
6
much of the discussion below.
We discovered that despite the near universal adoption of disclosure
laws, very few states have succeeded in enacting comprehensive systems. To the contrary, most reporting schemes display internal inconsistency, tensions with other statutes or rules, definitional ambiguity,
unexplained omissions, or general lack of clarity and planning.
Parts II through VII of this article describe and analyze the universe of financial disclosure laws. We begin by considering the various
sources of authority for financial disclosure, and we then survey the
various procedural aspects of the disclosure requirements. The following section examines the substantive information required by disclosure laws in the areas of business and investment, real estate, trusts
and fiduciary relationships, loans, gifts, and reimbursements. The next
section discusses minimums or "triggers" for disclosure. We then idenresponse to our survey indicated no disclosure was required in South Dakota. Since a formal
requirement for disclosure exists, this article treats South Dakota as a disclosure jurisdiction
even though the state may choose unenforcement.
3. A copy of that survey is included as Appendix II at the end of this article.
4. Ohio did not respond. Hawaii did not respond to the original survey. However, Hawaii
promulgated a rule governing financial disclosure effective January 1, 1988, that was drafted
after consultation with one of the authors and incorporated some of this article's recommendations. See Order Adding Rule 15 to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
(Haw. Jan. 21, 1988) (on file).
5. The jurisdictions that sent forms were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal system (on file).
6. All of the governing provisions are listed in Appendix I, which should be consulted when
subsequent footnotes list jurisdictions without providing lengthy citations. Our survey questionnaire is found in Appendix II.
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tify the jurisdictions in which financial disclosure is or is not public,
and explore some of the issues that arise with respect to "non-public"
reporting. The last analytic section identifies the penalties for nondisclosure. Finally, in Part VIII we offer our recommendations for improving reporting requirements.
II.

AUTHORITY FOR REQUIRING FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

Judges may be required to file financial disclosure statements under
the authority of a constitutional provision, 7 the Code of Judicial Conduct,8 a court rule other than the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 a statute, 10

7. Florida is the only state requiring disclosure by constitutional provision. FLA. CONST.
art. II, § 8. The constitutional provision came about as a result of a political struggle between
the governor and the legislature. For a discussion of the political background leading to the
constitutional amendment, see Henslovitz & Greenberg, ConstitutionalLimitations on Florida's
FinancialDisclosureLaws, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 872, 873-80 (1979).
8. The MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984) has been adopted by the District of
Columbia, the federal system, and every state except Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
Of the 49 jurisdictions with the Code of Judicial Conduct, 40 have adopted some version of its
reporting requirements, either verbatim from the Code or in an amended version. Of the remaining nine jurisdictions, three (Idaho, Louisiana, and Utah) have no reporting requirements, and
six (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) have eliminated the
reporting requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct and rely on a statute or on a different rule.
The Code has two reporting requirements. Canon 6C provides:
A judge should report the date, place, and nature of any activity for which he
received compensation, and the name of the payor and amount of compensation so
received. Compensation or income of a spouse attributed to the judge by operation
of a community property law is not extra-judicial compensation to the judge. His
report should be made at least annually and should be filed as a public document
in the office of the clerk of the court on which he serves or other office designated
by rule of court.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (1980).
Canon 5C(4)(c) provides:
[A] judge or member of his family residing in his household may accept any other
gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or other person whose
interests have come or are likely to come before him, and, if its value exceeds
$100, the judge reports it in the same manner as he reports compensation in Canon
6C.
Id.
9. There are three states that utilize court rules other than the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Hawaii and Pennsylvania have eliminated the Code's reporting requirements and substituted
different rules. Wisconsin, which has not yet adopted the Code, does have a rule requiring
financial disclosure. Maryland recently adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, which became
effective July 1, 1987. Before adoption of the Code, Maryland had a detailed court rule requiring
financial disclosure. Maryland retained this rule in lieu of Canon 6C. Illinois is similar to Maryland. The current financial disclosure rule became effective August 1, 1986. When the Code of
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or an administrative order.", Table 1 identifies the source of authority
for requiring disclosure in each jurisdiction. As the table indicates,
forty-nine of fifty-two jurisdictions require some type of financial disclosure by judges.
In forty-four of the forty-nine disclosure jurisdictions, the requirement has been imposed in whole or in part under the authority of the
court system, usually through the Code of Judicial Conduct (the
Code).' 2 In fourteen of these forty-four jurisdictions the Code is the
sole authority requiring financial disclosure. 13 Another twenty-one
jurisdictions have dual provisions, utilizing both the Code and a state
statute applying to all public officials. 14 Three jurisdictions require
financial disclosure under the Code and statutes applying only to

Judicial Conduct became effective January 1, 1987, Illinois kept the previous financial disclosure
rule intact. For our purposes, both Illinois and Maryland are treated as Code jurisdictions,
although their disclosure requirements vary markedly from the Model Code.
10. Two types of statutes control judicial financial disclosure. The first is a comprehensive
conflict of interest statute applying to public officials generally. This typically includes provisions
prohibiting certain conflicts of interest by public officials in addition to provisions requiring
financial disclosure. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-599-634 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.17.010-945 (Supp. 1987). The second type is a statute applying only to judges. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-8 -8 (West
1983 & Supp. 1987).
11. Two states require financial disclosure by administrative order. New York has an
administrative order which is substantially the same as Canon 6C. See N.Y. RULES OF THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS § 100.6. New Jersey has an administrative order in
lieu of Canon 6C. See Memorandum from Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges (July 12,
1982).
12. Five states do not require financial disclosure under the authority of the judicial system.
Arizona, California, and Kentucky have deleted the reporting requirements of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, even though the Code in these states applies to other judicial conduct. Montana
and Rhode Island have not yet adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct.
13. These jurisdictions are Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming. See Table 1.
14. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and the federal system. See Table 1.
Oregon, Texas, and Washington do not have detailed financial disclosure required under their
Code of Judicial Conduct. Instead, each of these states has a provision in its Code of Judicial
Conduct requiring compliance with the state statute on financial disclosure. These states are
nevertheless treated as dual provision states because each has both a statute and a provision
in the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring financial disclosure. Ohio requires reporting under
the statute but also requires reporting under Canon 5C(4)(c) and 6C. Maryland, on the other
hand, defers to the court rule on financial disclosure in its statutes.
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judges. 15 One jurisdiction requires financial disclosure under the Code
and an order of the state court administrator's office. 16 Finally, another
jurisdiction requires financial disclosure under the Code and the state
constitution.

17

The remaining four jurisdictions that require financial disclosure
under the authority of the court system have deleted the reporting
requirements of the Code. In two states the reporting requirement
comes from a court rule. 18 In another state the reporting requirement
originates in an order of the state court administrator's office,19 and
in the third state the disclosure requirement comes from a statute
applying to public officers and a special rule applying to judges. 20
Two findings relating to the authority for disclosure are significant.
First, an unexpectedly large number of jurisdictions (twenty-seven)
have two different provisions requiring disclosure. Second, an even
larger number (forty-four) require disclosure under the authority of
the court system.
In a few of the jurisdictions with multiple disclosure provisions,
the requirements blend so that either a statute requires judges to
22
follow a court rule21 or a court rule requires judges to follow a statute.
These obviously present no problems. More typically, however, the
states with multiple provisions require judges to file disclosure reports
under two separate rules or statutes, each calling for different items
of information. Such dual provisions may make compliance with disclosure unnecessarily onerous. The provisions may require different reports to be filed at different times. 2 Often the rule and statute apply

15. The jurisdictions are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Indiana. See Table 1.
Connecticut, like Oregon, Texas, and Washington, see supra note 14, has a provision in its Code
requiring compliance with the statute on financial disclosure.
16. The jurisdiction is New York. See Table 1.
17. The jurisdiction is Florida. Id. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
18. The states are Hawaii and Pennsylvania. See Order Adding Rule 15 to the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (flaw. Jan. 21, 1988) (on file); In re Financial
Disclosure & Reporting Requirements for Judicial Officers, No. 47 (Pa. Apr. 13, 1984) (order
requiring financial disclosure) (on file).
19. In New Jersey the requirement is an order of the state court administration office. See
Memorandum for Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges (July 12, 1982) (clarifying policy
which required judicial reports of pending litigation) (on file).
20. The state is Wisconsin. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.41-59 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987)
Wis. Sup. CT. R. 60.18.
21.
22.

MD. ANN. CODE. art. 40A, § 4-105(a) (1986).
CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(4)(c); WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL

Canon 6C.
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.

CONDUCT

23.
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to different people.2' In the worst cases, the substantive requirements
of the rule and statute are facially inconsistent or actually conflict
with one another.3The predominance of court rules as the preferred vehicle for disclosure, on the other hand, is consistent with the inherent supervisory
authority of state supreme courts to regulate the conduct of judges.2
Only two cases are reported in which judges attempted to challenge
their state supreme court's authority to require financial disclosure
by court rule, and those attempts were not successful.2
In the years following Watergate and Abscam, when the first conflict of interest state statutes were enacted, they were subject to a

variety of constitutional attacks by public officers. Although courts
sustained few of these constitutional challenges,2 some uncertainty

existed about whether state legislatures could, consistent with the
separation of powers doctrine, constitutionally require compliance by
the judiciary. Judges were thus exempted from some of the early
financial disclosure laws.2 We think that this early uncertainty largely
explains the initial lack of legislation in this area.

24. See infra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.
25. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-53 (Harrison Supp. 1987) (financial disclosure reports
are public); vith GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (financial disclosure reports or
tax returns filed in lieu of reports are to be filed under seal and available for inspection only
to justices of the Georgia Supreme Court and members of the Georgia Judicial Qualification
Commission).
26. See D. PUGH, C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI, & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A
COMPENDIUM 274 (1984). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING
TO COURT ORGANIZATION

(1974).

27. Matter of Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997 (1987); In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235
N.W.2d 409 (1975), reh'g denied, 70 Wis. 2d 543, 238 N.W.2d 63 (1976).
28. Many of the cases involving financial disclosure at all levels of public office, elected as
well as appointed, statewide and local, are summarized in Annotation, Validity and Construction
of Orders and Enactments Requiring Public Officers and Employees or Candidatesfor Public
QOfice to Disclose FinancialCondition, Interests, or Relationships, 22 A.L.R. 4th 238-84 (1981).
29. Initially judges were neither part of the Massachusetts nor the Nevada financial disclosure laws. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 795, 376 N.E.2d 810 (1976);
Dunphy v. Sheehen, 92 Nev. 259, 549 P.2d 332 (1976). Judges must now file in Massachusetts.
Nevada, however, still has a provision excluding judges. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 281.4365
(1986), even though most Nevada judges apparently file the disclosure report required by
statute. Telephone interview with Harry Liparelli, Assistant State Court Administrator of the
State of Nevada (July 7, 1987). Some states still explicitly exempt judges from filing under the
public officers statute. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 84-2 (1985). But see Order Adding Rule 15 to
the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (Haw. Jan. 21, 1988) (supreme court
rule governing financial disclosure for Hawaii judges) (on file).
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By now, however, most doubts about statutory authority to require
judicial disclosure have been resolved. In 1978, Congress passed the
Ethics in Government Act, which was the federal response to the
Watergate scandal. 30 The Act was a comprehensive attempt to avoid
conflicts of interest which could damage public confidence in the integrity of government 1 A major provision of the Act required high level
officials in all three branches of government to file detailed financial
disclosure statements.32
Soon after the Act was passed, six federal judges filed a class
action lawsuit challenging it. The judges claimed the Act violated the
separation of powers doctrine, and unconstitutionally invaded their
right of privacy. The judges also argued that the Act denied them
due process and equal protection, and that the penalty provisions
would diminish their compensation in violation of article III of the
Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these challenges stating:
It is evident that there is a growing public demand for accountability and integrity of public officials and the Act is
designed to carry out that purpose. There are only about
850 federal judges but it is clear that they occupy an expanding role in today's society. In the appropriate weighing of
the competing interests, it is significant that 23 states have
enacted similar laws, and financial disclosure for judges in
those states is now routine. In balancing judicial accountability with judicial independence, we are unable to hold that
the Act's objectives so clearly intrude upon the judicial functions that they are unconstitutional3
Following this holding, the validity of financial disclosure statutes
seems certain. No challenge has succeeded in completely overturning
a disclosure statute and only one suit successfully challenged a statute's
applicability to judges. Of course, the authority of state supreme
30. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) [hereinafter
Ethics in Government Act]. See also S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1978) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT] (discussing background of legislation).
31. SENATE REPORT, &upranote 30, at 1 & 21-22.
32. Ethics in Government Act, supra note 30. Financial disclosure for the judiciary is
codified at 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-09 (1982).
33. Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076
(1981).
34. Id. at 673.
35. Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 503 Pa. 358, 469 A.2d 593 (1983). But cf. Matter of
Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Rule requiring financial disclosure after the public officers statute was ruled
unconstitutional as to judges).
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courts to regulate judicial conduct, including financial disclosure, is
even more firmly established. Given the reality of judicially mandated
disclosure, little reason now exists for legislatures to enter the field.
III. PROCEDURAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

Tables 2 through 4 present information on the more mechanical
aspects of filing: whose assets and liabilities must be disclosed, when
reports must be filed, and where they must be filed.
A.

Who Must File

Table 2 identifies the judges and family members covered by financial disclosure requirements. Not surprisingly, disclosure applies to
practically all full-time judges in every one of the forty-nine jurisdictions that require disclosure. On the other hand, disclosure generally
is not required of part-time, pro-tem or retired judges.
As noted above, forty jurisdictions require disclosure in whole or
in part under Canon 6C .of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The compliance section of the Code specifically exempts part-time, pro-tem,
and retired judges from the disclosure requirements of Canon 6C. 7

36. Exclusions are relatively few. Alabama excludes probate judges because these officers
are primarily administrative and executive. See ALABAMA CODE OF' JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
Compliance Section C. Arizona excludes appointed town and city magistrates because the statute
covers only elected officials. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-541(6), (8)(1985); Letter from
Marsha Klinker to Michael Antonello (July 14, 1986) (explaining Arizona's reasons for exemption
of appointed town and city magistrates) (on file). Maine excludes probate judges. MAINE CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. New York excludes judges authorized to practice law. N.Y. RULES
OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS, § 100.6(c). Oregon excludes municipal judges
in cities that voted against financial disclosure. OR. REV. STAT. § 244.050(b) (1985).
37. The Code does require full disclosure in the case of a retired judge who "receives the
same compensation as a full-time judge on the court from which he retired and is eligible for
recall to judicial service." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Compliance Section C (1980). Of the
40 jurisdictions that require some type of disclosure under the Code, either by itself or in
combination with another provision, 18 jurisdictions (Alaska, Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the federal
system) have adopted this language from the Code and exempt pro-tem, part-time, and retired
judges except those receiving the same compensation as full-time judges and eligible for recall.
Indiana, by statute, however, does require pro-tern judges who sit more than 20 times in a
calendar year to file financial disclosure reports. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-8-1(i) (West Supp.
1987). An additional six jurisdictions (Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina,
and Texas) either have no compliance section or they have a compliance section that does not
exempt part-time, pro-tem, or retired judges and these states evidently require these officials
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A partial rationale for this exemption is that these judges are entitled
to pursue remunerative activities generally not available to full-time
judges, and hence there is less need to monitor the scope of their
activities." Exemption from reporting, however, need not follow from

the admitted need to allow part-time judges a greater scope of permitted financial activity.3 9 The purpose of financial disclosure is both to
guard against impermissible financial activity and to discourage and
expose untenable conflicts of interest. While there is probably less

to file the same disclosure as full-time judges. In three jurisdictions (Alabama, Florida, and
Oklahoma) retired judges must file disclosure reports, but the compliance section closely parallels
the Code and exempts part-time and pro-tern judges.
In 13 jurisdictions the compliance section of the Code does not treat part-time, pro-tem, and
retired judges uniformly and it is not always clear who must file and who is exempt. In Colorado
part-time and retired judges are exempt from Canon 6C but the compliance section does not
mention pro-tern judges. In Georgia part-time judges must report compensation from personal
services other than the practice of law; pro-tern judges are exempt and the Code does not
address retired judges. In Washington pro-tern and part-time judges are exempt from Canon
6C, but the compliance section does not mention retired judges. In Iowa senior and retired
judges are expected to comply with the Code, part-time judges are exempt from Canon 6C,
and pro-tern judges are not mentioned. In Kansas all are exempt; no special provision is made
for retired judges receiving the same compensation as full-time judges and eligible for recall.
In Maryland resigned and retired judges are not exempt during their period of eligibility for
recall, but pro-tern and part-time judges are not mentioned. In Massachusetts retired judges
are expressly required to comply with the Code during their eligibility for recall, but pro-tem
and part-time judges are not mentioned. In Michigan part-time judges who practice law must
report income from their law practices, but pro-tern and retired judges are not mentioned. In
Minnesota part-time judges are exempt, retired judges receiving the same compensation as
full-time judges and eligible for recall must comply, and pro-tem judges are not mentioned. In
Missouri part-time judges are exempt from Canon 6C, but pro-tern and retired judges are not
mentioned. In Ohio part-time judges must file the statutory disclosure form (required by the
Ohio version of Canon 6C) but are exempt from the report of extrajudicial and quasijudicial
income, while the compliance section expressly exempts pro-tern and retired judges from Canon
6C. In Oregon part-time judges must comply with Canon 6C, but pro-tern judges are exempt.
Senior and retired judges must comply with the Canon when they are receiving compensation
as full-time judges and are eligible for recall. The Oregon Code does not mention other senior
or retired judges. In Connecticut the compliance section exempts senior judges and referees
from Canon 6C, but Connecticut has no Canon 6C; reporting is required by Canon 5C(4)(c) and
by statute.
In addition to the jurisdictions that require reporting by the Code of Judicial Conduct, three
other jurisdictions also require some form of disclosure by part-time, pro-tem, or retired judges.
The Hawaii rule applies to part-time judges; the Wisconsin rule applies to reserve judges; and
the Pennsylvania rule applies to senior judges who have served during a given reporting period.
38. See E. THODE, REPORTERS' NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT 101-03 (1973).
39. For a more detailed discussion of the financial activities permitted to judges, see Lubet,
Regulation of Judges' Business and FinancialActivities, 37 EMORY L.J. 1 (1988).
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need to monitor part-time judges' potentially proscribed conduct, they
are obviously no less likely than full-time judges to become involved
in conflicts of interest. Indeed, the broader nature of their financial
lives would seem to require more disclosure, not less. 0
Table 2 also indicates that twenty jurisdictions require financial
disclosure by candidates for judicial office. The requirements for disclosure by candidates are almost invariably part of a comprehensive
government ethics statute, which generally includes a code of ethics,
restrictions on lobbying, and provisions requiring financial disclosure

by public officials and candidates for public office. 41

The parts of Table 2 discussed thus far apply only to judicial offi-

cers. Although we question excluding certain part-time judges from
disclosure, requiring disclosure by judges and candidates for judicial
office has an overtly rational basis and is not particularly controversial.
The application of disclosure requirements to judges' family members

raises a more difficult question.4
Table 2 indicates that in eighteen states the requirements for re-

porting assets and liabilities of a judge's spouse and dependents are
basically the same as those for the judge .43 Sixteen jurisdictions require
disclosure of different, usually less, information about family members
than about the judges themselves.- An additional fourteen jurisdic-

40. See recommendations in part VIII, infra.
41. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 601-101 to 604A-107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 244.010-.390 (1985). But see FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (constitutional provision
requiring candidates for judicial office to comply with financial disclosure); IND. CODE ANN. §

33-2.1-8-6 (Burns Supp. 1987) (requirement of financial disclosure for candidates contained within
statute applying only to judges).
42. Family members typically include the judge's spouse and minor dependents. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 36-25-1 (10), (12) (Supp. 1986).

43. In six states, Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island,
reporting is required under a single rule or statute. In five states, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, reporting is required under both a rule and a statute, but the rule either
defers to the statute or the requirements under the rule and the statute are basically the same.
In seven states, Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi (spouses only), Nevada, Tennessee,
and Virginia, reporting is required under both a statute and the Code. Although there are
differences between the Code and the statutes in these states, the Code seems to require less
information about spouses and dependents than about the judges. See infra note 45. This article
treats the statute as taking precedence either because the Code's information is already required
by statute or because the survey's response suggested that the state gave a higher priority to
enforcement of the statute than the Code.
44. The information which family members are exempt from disclosing varies from one
jurisdiction to another. They may be exempt from disclosing information in certain categories.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5813(a)(4), c., d. (1983) (reimbursements and honoraria);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(6) (1981) (real estate), § 11-1530(a)(7) (reimbursements and hon-
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tions require information either entirely or in part under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and because of the manner in which the Code is
drafted it is not possible to tell whether disclosure for judges and
family members is the same or different. 45 Finally, in one jurisdiction,
New Jersey, the limited disclosure of pending litigation applies only
to judges.
The section of Table 2 dealing with disclosure of family members'
finances is complex because the requirements are diverse. In some
states, uncertainty exists as to whether financial disclosure can constitutionally be applied to family members. Financial disclosure provisions applied to public officers themselves are justified by the legitimate state objective of avoiding and exposing conflicts of interest,46
but it has not always been equally clear that the same legislation was
constitutional when applied to the separate privacy interests of family
members.

47

Few challenges to disclosure laws based on the privacy rights of
family members have been reported, and the courts have primarily
upheld the laws. The rationale is one of necessity: absent a family
disclosure requirement, a judge could transfer assets to spouse or
children and escape entirely the requirements of disclosure. 4 Interests

oraria); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-8-8(1) (Burns Supp. 1987) (gifts); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
19.44(I)(g) (West 1986) (gifts). In other jurisdictions judges may have to disclose less about the
income from or values of their family members' business activities than they do about themselves.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(b)(2) (West 1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B,
§ 5(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). In two jurisdictions, Arkansas and the District of Columbia,
spouses disclose different information from judges and the statutes do not apply to dependents.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3005(c) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a) (1981).
45. One of the ambiguities in the American Bar Association's Model CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1980) is whether the disclosure requirements are identical for judges and family
members. Canon 5C(4)(c) would suggest that when gifts, favors, bequests, or loans valued at
over $100 are accepted by judges or family members, disclosure is required. See text of Canon
5C(4)(c), supra note 8. On the other hand, Canon 6C, which requires reporting of activities for
which a judge receives compensation and the amount received from these activities, appears to
exclude spouses and is silent as to other family members. See text of Canon 6C, supranote 8.
46. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 795, 802-09, 376 N.E.2d 810,
816-20 (1978) (response to a Massachusetts Senate question regarding the constitutionality of
an initiative petition seeking passage of a comprehensive ethics law governing public officers,
and deciding that the proposal was not an unconstitutional invasion of family members' privacy).
48. See Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d 570, 575 (Ala. 1980); In re
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 528, 235 N.W.2d 409, 418 (1975). But cf. Denoncourt v. State Ethics
Comm'n, 504 Pa. 191, 200, 470 A.2d 945, 949 (1983) ("a public official determined to evade the
financial reporting requirements of the act will merely transfer various property interests to
individuals or business entities outside of his immediate family").
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held in the name of family members can compromise a judge's impartiality as much as interests held by the judge alone. 49
Interestingly, it appears that no statute or rule deals specifically
with the problem of the recalcitrant spouse who refuses to provide
the judge with the necessary financial information 0 Some states may
have attempted to address this problem sub silentio by requiring
either no disclosure 1 or confidential disclosure about the financial affairs of spouses. 2 If confidential disclosure is a solution, it is an ineffective one that overcomes spousal reluctance only at the expense of
disclosure itself. Without public disclosure, nothing prevents the judge
from concealing assets under the spouse's name. Even without concealment, the spouse's ownership of assets continues to carry the
potential for conflict of interest.5
Other states may have attempted to address the reluctant spouse
problem by requiring less disclosure of spouses' finances than of the
judges' finances5 The effectiveness of this solution depends on the
nature and extent of the exclusions. It is obviously ineffective to
exempt from disclosure gifts to a spouse,s real estate held by a
spouse,0 or stock held by a spouse,5 7 because these exemptions could
obscure a substantial conflict of interest for the judge.
Finally, a few states have utilized language limiting the duty to
disclose to that information which the public officer can reasonably be

49. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 528, 235 N.W.2d at 418.
Canon 3C as a basis for disqualification is discussed in Lubet, supranote 39, at 6 & 23. See
also L. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF

THE CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1986).
50. This problem most often affects assets of judges' spouses rather than those of their
minor dependents, because minor dependents are not likely to be dealing with substantial
financial assets.
51. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5-50 to -53 (Harrison 1987).
52. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(c) (West 1985).
53. See County of Nevada v. MacMUllen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 676, 522 P.2d 1345, 1353, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 353 (1974) which states
Common sense tells us that although an official may have no economic interest in
[a spouse's or child's property], nevertheless he may react favorably, or without
total objectivity, to a proposal which could materially enhance the value of that
property. Disclosure might substantially inhibit any such sympathetic reaction,
thereby promoting the act's goals of honesty and impartiality in government.

Id.
54. See supra notes 43-45.
55. See IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-8-8(1) (Burns Supp. 1987).
56. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(6) (1981).
57. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4225(11) (West 1987).
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expected to know.5 This type of provision might place judges under
an obligation diligently to attempt to discover and disclose their
spouses' finances, but would also seem to offer some protection to
those judges whose spouses refuse to cooperate. While this approach
may serve the interests of both judge and spouse, it does not vindicate
the public interest in full disclosure.
B.

Where and When to File

Table 3 indicates where financial disclosure reports must be filed.
This material is neither complicated nor controversial, but it should
be noted that in twenty-six jurisdictions the forms must be filed in
more than one place, either because dual provisions require separate
reports, 59 or a single filing authority requires duplicate reports filed
in separate locations, 6° or because different judges must file in different
61
places.
In eight jurisdictions a copy of the report is filed with the state
court administrator's office. In fifteen jurisdictions a copy is fied with
the public ethics commission, and in five jurisdictions a copy is fied
with the judicial conduct organization. In twenty-three jurisdictions a
copy is filed with the supreme court, either with the chief justice or
the clerk. In ten jurisdictions a copy is filed with the secretary of
state, and in two jurisdictions a copy is filed with a county or city
clerk. In seven jurisdictions a copy is filed with a local court clerk,

58. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(a) (1987) ("Each statement shall be an accurate representation of the financial affairs of the public official or candidate and shall contain the same
information for each member of the person's family, as specified in (b) of this section, to the
extent that it is ascertainable .... "); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 268B, § 5(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987) ("Reporting persons shall disclose, to the best of their knowledge, the following information
... such persons shall also disclose the same information with respect to their immediate family
59. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-202(1) (1982) (requiring statutory forms to be filed
in office of Secretary of State) with COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring
compensation forms under the Code of Judicial Conduct to be filed in office of clerk of court on
which judge sits or other office designated by rule of court).
60. See CAL. Govr CODE § 87500(i) (West 1987) (requiring reports to be filed with the
clerk of the court who makes and keeps a copy and sends the original to the Fair Practices
Commission).
61. See, e.g., N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring supreme court
justices and court of appeals judges to file with the clerk of the court of appeals, and judges
of other courts to file with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which they are sitting).
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and in seven jurisdictions judges must file in other places, such as
with the secretary of the judicial conference6 or an administrative
judge6
The authority for filing does not appear to control the locale for
filing to any substantial degree. Although most reports to be filed
with the state supreme court are required to be filed there as a result
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, state codes also require reports to
be filed with public ethics commtissions,6 state court administrators,6
and judicial conduct organizations.6 Similarly, although most of the
requirements that reports be filed with public ethics commissions come
from public ethics laws, such laws also require reports to be fied with
the secretary of state67 or the supreme court.6
Table 4 indicates the frequency of filing. All but two of the fortynine jurisdictions require the report to be ified annually.69 The exceptions are Montana, which requires a report every other year, 70 and
New Jersey which requires reporting only when judges know they
1
are involved in pending litigation.7
Two additional comments can be made about the annual financial
disclosure reports. First, many of the jurisdictions require the reports
to be filed on or shortly after April 15th to coincide with the review
of financial affairs that must be done to file federal income tax forms.
Second, eight jurisdictions require two reports ified on two different
dates. All of these eight jurisdictions require one report under the
Code of Judicial Conduct and one under state statute.72
62.

See MIss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.

63.

New York survey response.

64.
65.

E.g., ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 6C.
E.g., MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.

66.

E.g., OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.

67.
68.

E.g., Ariz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A (1985).
E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-850 (Law. Co-op. 1986).

69.

Oklahoma requires the statutory report to be filed every other year and the Code of

Judicial Conduct report to be filed every year. Compare OKLA. REV. STAT. tit. 74, § 4225
(West 1987) with OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-213 (1987).
71. Memorandum from Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges (July 12, 1982) (on file).
72. Sometimes the difference in dates is seemingly inconsequential. Compare ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (statute requiring report to be filed by
May 1 of each year) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative
Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (Code of Judicial Conduct requirement that reports be filed on
or before April 30). Although the difference in dates under the Illinois provisions seems incon-

sequential, it can be quite burdensome for judges who must prepare two financial reports, each
reqairing somewhat different information, stated in different ways by two dates that are so
close. Sometimes the dates are more widely separated. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3005(a)

(1979) (requiring filing on or before last day in January) with Order, 255 Ark. 1073, 493 S.W.2d
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Eighteen jurisdictions require judicial candidates to file disclosure
reports within a certain time period after the candidate becomes eligible for judicial office. Except for Alabama which has a candidate
filing requirement in the Code, all states requiring that candidates
file financial disclosure reports do so under state statutes.
In addition, fourteen jurisdictions require the filing of financial
disclosure reports within a specified time after appointment to judicial
office. These requirements are all found in statutes, although Illinois
has a parallel requirement in its financial disclosure court rule.7 Finally, eleven jurisdictions have other requirements involving the time
of filing financial disclosure reports: four jurisdictions require reports
upon leaving office,74 two require amendments as financial status
changes, 75 three states require reports within a certain period before
or after elections, 7s one state requires a report within a period before
the expiration of a term of office,7 and one state requires a report
within twenty-one days of nomination. 7

IV.

SUBSTANTIVE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

Tables 5, 6, and 7 are to be read together. These tables identify

the financial information that judges are required to disclose and reflect
422 (1973) (per curiam order directing annual reports be filed during June). Regardless of
whether multiple filing dates are close or far apart, the obligation to file different reports on
different dates imposes a burden on judges. It would make more sense for judges to be required
to file a single comprehensive financial disclosure report on a single date than to require multiple,
overlapping reports.
73. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-105(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (requiring statement to be filed at time of initial appointment or employment) with ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (Code of
Judicial Conduct requirement that every person who becomes a judge or associate judge file
statement within 45 days after assuming office).
74. See In re Financial Disclosure and Reporting Requirements for Judicial Officers, No.
47 (Pa. Apr. 13, 1984) (on file); 28 U.S.C. app. § 301(d) (1982); CAL. Gov"r CODE § 87204 (West
1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.080(1)(b) (1985).
75. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-202(4) (1982) (requiring every person who files a statement
to file an annual amendment or a statement in writing indicating that there has been no change
since the date of filing the previous statement); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(b)(1)(A),
(2)(E) (West 1985) (requiring judges, spouses, and dependents who receive an honorarium to
file a report of the amount received within 30 days).
76. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-50(a) (Harrison Supp. 1987) (not later than 10 days after
qualifying for election); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A)(7) (Baldwin 1984) (no later than
30 days before the election; for write in candidates no earlier than 20 days before first election
at which candidate will be voted on); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4223A, B, C (West 1987)
(within 40 days after election or during period specified by statute).
77. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 281.561(3) (1986).
78. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.43(3) (West Supp. 1987).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/1

16

Rosenbaum and Lubet: Financial Disclosure by Judges: Functional Analysis and Critique
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY JUDGES

the different ways the information must be reported. Table 5 identifies
the states that require judges to disclose income received from business activities and financial dealings. 79 In some states, either in addition to or instead of an income reporting requirement, judges must
disclose specified information on financial activities or property holdings. Table 6 identifies the states that require this type of reporting.
Finally, regardless of whether a state requires judges to report income, activities, or both, most states do not require reporting if the
judges' financial involvement is minimal. Table 7 identifies for each
state the various base figures that trigger reporting of either income
or activities or both. °
79. Typically judges do not have to disclose the exact amount of income received. Rather,
they either are required to identify the name and nature of the business from which income is
received, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-102(b)(1) & (2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-16(b)(2) (1984), or to identify the income by category, indicating
whether it is greater or less than specified amounts as opposed to a precise figure, see ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542B (1985); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
But cf. Order Promulgating Forms and Instructions with Respect to Judicial Financial Disclosure
Statements (Md. Dec. 12, 1985) (apparently requiring disclosure of exact amounts where figures
are called for) (on file).
Under the Code the question of how the information must be disclosed is more complex.
Canon 6C of the Code says, "A judge should report the date, place, and nature of any activity
for which he received compensation, and the name of the payor and the amount of compensation
so received." CODE OF JUDICIALJ CONDUCT Canon 6C (1980). It would seem then, that disclosure
of specific amounts of income is required, and in fact some states do require specific amounts
on their reporting forms. See, e.g., Mo. Public Report of Extra-Judicial Income Pursuant to
Rule 2, Canon 5 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics (on file). But the states vary considerably
in the way they require reporting under the Code. Some require the reporting only of names
for "compensation," see, e.g., Fla. Judicial Qualifications Commission Form 6B, but require
specific amounts for "gifts" which in many states must be reported under Canon 5C(4)(c), see
Fla. Judicial Qualifications Commission Form 6A. Some require specific amounts for compensation but not for gifts, see, e.g., Neb. Judicial Financial Interest Statement (compare Item 2 &
Item 4) (on file); some require no amounts, see Ala. Disclosure Statement of Financial Interests
(on file); and some do not indicate clearly on their forms how the reporting is to be done, see
N.H. Public Report of Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial and Extra Judicial Activities
(on file).

80. In addition to trigger amounts, states often exclude from disclosure gifts from family
members, the mortgage on the judge's family residence, and creditors on retail installment
contracts. The reasons for such exclusions are not clear. It may be that certain interests such
as gifts from family members are considered de minimis and that the burden of disclosure
outweighs any benefit to be gained from the information. Perhaps some states have attempted
to create a zone of privacy for the judge's personal life. Some of these exclusions do not appear
problematic. For example, since a judge is normally disqualified from hearing matters involving
the interests of family members, there is little additional information on conflicts of interest
that the public will gain from requiring judges to disclose gifts from family members. See CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(c), (d) (1980). On the other hand, the rationale behind
other exclusions should be thought through more carefully to ensure that the exclusion does
not thwart the purpose of financial disclosure. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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To discuss these tables in more detail, we have subdivided them
into smaller categories: business activities; interests in real property;
interests in trusts; loans; gifts and reimbursement of expenses; and
miscellaneous reporting requirements involving disclosures such as
income due from past businesses or pending litigation, campaign income and expenses,"' and insurance policies and annuities.2
Before discussing these specific categories we should note that
practically every jurisdiction requires either explicitly 3 or implicitly4
that judges disclose the general sources of their income.s This type
of provision may indicate a state's intent that disclosure be broad
rather than narrow. So many sources of income and activities are
possible, however, particularly for a married judge, that it is easy to
overlook information that should be disclosed. General reporting requirements are an invitation to incompleteness and inconsistency. A
far better approach is for the state to categorize and enumerate the
items that must be disclosed. A state may supplement such written
requirements with clear forms that track the categories, perhaps using
definitions that give non-limiting examples.6 This method promotes
thoroughness and uniformity in disclosureY

81. This article does not attempt to discuss campaign reporting statutes under which candidates for office typically must disclose in detail the source of each contribution and expenditure
involved in a campaign. Some financial disclosure statutes and rules, however, specify that
certain items of campaign income and expenses be disclosed. Michigan, for example, requires
judges to include on their financial disclosure forms a summary of the Secretary of State's more
detailed information of what they received for a judicial campaign. Campaign information such
as Michigan's that is required as part of a provision applicable to a sitting judge is included in
this article.
82. See Section V, infra, for a separate discussion of minimum or 'trigger" requirements.
83. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a) (1981) ("[Elach judge . . . shall . . . file (1) A
report of his income and his spouse's income . . .the sources thereof, and the amount and
nature of the income received from each such source.").
84. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-502(1) (1980) ("Disclosure shall be made of: (1) In general
terms of areas of interest, the major source or sources of private income of the person making
disclosure, his spouse, or minor children residing with him, but no firm or organization need
be named nor dollar amounts be stated.'.
85. The only states that do not have this requirement in some form are Montana, where
disclosure is limited to business activities, and New Jersey, where financial disclosure is limited
to income anticipated from pending litigation. See MONT. REV. STAT § 5-7-213 (1987); Memorandum from Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges (July 12, 1982) (on file).
86. Many statutes include definition sections. For example, the definition of gifts in Oregon
is:
(5) "Gift" means something of economic value given to a public official or member
of the official's household without valuable consideration. . ., including the full or
partial forgiveness of indebtedness, which isnot extended to others who are not
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A. Business
Although states define "business activity" in slightly different
ways,88 business activities typically include either ownership of stock
or other equities, or service as an officer, director, employee or consultant of a firm, partnership, corporation, or enterprise. Generally
"business" connotes a profit making venture. Even though the Model

public officials... ; and something of economic value given to a public official or
member of the official's household for valuable consideration less than that required
from others who are not public officials. However, "gift" does not mean:
(a) Campaign contributions ....
(b) Gifts from relatives.
(c) The giving or receiving of food, lodging and travel when participating in an
event which bears a relationship to the public official's office and when appearing
in an official capacity provided that when such expenses incurred exceed $50, such
expenses shall be disclosed yearly on a form prescribed by the commission stating
the name, nature, and business address of the organization paying the public official's expenses and the date and amount of that expenditure.
OR.REV. STAT. § 244.020(6) (1987). Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.42(6) (West 1986) ("Gift' means
the payment or receipt of anything of value without valuable consideration.").
87. The Massachusetts form is one of the clearest. See Mass. Statement of Financial Interests
for Calendar Year 1985 (on file). The six page disclosure statement is divided into 15 subdivisions
as follows: (A) Filing Status (personal data); (B) Other Government Positions; (C) Employment
and Other Associations with Business and Non-Governmental Entities (Including Non-Profit
Organizations and Certain Trusts); (D) Business Ownership/Equity; (E)Transfers of Business
Ownership/Equity Interests; (F) State or Local Government Securities; (G) Securities and Investments; (H) Trusts; (I) Leaves of Absence; (J) Gifts, Honoraria and Reimbursements; (K) Real
Property; (L) Other Creditor Information; (M) Debts Forgiven; (N) Status of Filer (Optional);
and (0) Certification. Id. Two of these categories are further subdivided. Section J is divided
into a section on gifts, honoraria, reimbursements. Id. Section K is subdivided into five different
sections: real property owned in Massachusetts, investment and rental properties, real property
transfers, mortgage loan information, and mortgage receivable information. Id.
The blocks of information which must be entered for each category are dearly labeled and
the disclosure statement is accompanied by a nine page instruction sheet, organized by category
and further explaining what must be disclosed for each section.
88. Oregon defines business as a profit making venture. OR. REV.STAT. § 244.020(1) (1985)
("'Business' means any corporation, partnership, proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise,
association, organization, self-employed individual and any other legal entity operated for
economic
... ."). Arizona, on the other hand, includes not for profit entities in its definition
of business. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-541(1) (1985) (" 'Business' includes any enterprise,
organization, trade, occupation, or profession, whether or not operated as a legal entity or for
profit, including any business trust, corporation, partnership, joint venture or sole proprietorship."). For a more detailed discussion of the definition of business, see Lubet, supranote 39.
89. But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-3(4) (1984) (defining business to include both for profit
and not for profit activities).
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Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from engaging in some types

of business activities, it still allows them a fairly wide range for their
remunerative endeavors, including investment, writing, lecturing, and
real estate ownership and management. Many states have modified

the Code to allow participation in family businesses, or in businesses
not involving a public interest. Thirteen states place no restrictions
on judges' business activities, other than that they be dignified, nonexploitive, and conducted outside of judicial business hours.9 In any
event, the Code does not at all restrict the financial activities of judges'

spouses.
Because business activities involve the production of income, they
are often, though not always, covered by financial disclosure laws.
Certainly one reason most states require judges to disclose business
activities is the obvious potential for conflict of interest. Judges must
recuse themselves from cases in which they have business or financial
connections with a party or a lawyer, and failure to do so may result
in a disciplinary violation. 91 Financial disclosure both encourages voluntary compliance and enables the parties to check for inadvertent or
intentional failure to recuse.
Not surprisingly then, Table 5 indicates that forty-seven jurisdictions require disclosure of business income, loosely defined to include

dividends, profits, fees, capital gains, royalties, and salaries.9 A "y"
instead of an "x" is used on Table 5 to indicate that twenty-six jurisdictions require disclosure of sources or amounts of investment income.9a The remaining twenty-one jurisdictions limit disclosure to

90. For an extended discussion of the scope of permissible and prohibited business activities
by judges, see Lubet, supra note 39.
91. CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1980). See also L. ABRAMSON, supra note
49; Lubet, supra note 39, at 7 & 42.
92. New Jersey, which has limited its disclosure to pending litigation, does not require
disclosure of business income. In addition, Montana, which has neither a Code of Judicial Conduct
nor a provision requiring disclosure of income sources generally does not require disclosure of
business income. But cf. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5-7-102(12) & -213 (1987) (requiring disclosure
of business holdings valued in excess of $1,000 and past and present employment from which
benefits are received).
93. Disclosure of investment income is probably reflected in a statutory requirement that
a judge disclose sources of income generally. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4225(10)
(West 1987). In preparing the table we have treated this language as requiring judges to disclose
investment income. It is not clear, however, that this language is applied to require investment
income disclosure in practice. Moreover, since judges and their spouses are likely to have a
variety of sources of income, a more effective way of insuring investment income is disclosed
is for the controlling provisions to require at a minimum disclosure of sources of investment
income and for disclosure forms to include specific places for this information to be reported.
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salaries or compensation, which is typically defined as "income received
for services rendered,"9 and apparently does not include dividends or
income received from investments9 5
When Table 5 is read with Table 6, it becomes apparent that the
number of jurisdictions requiring judges to disclose their connections

to businesses is higher than simply the number requiring disclosure
of income. While twenty-six jurisdictions require disclosure of invest-

94. See, e.g.,
CIAL CONDUCT

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 42.17.020(8) (Supp. 1988);

DEL. CODE OF JUDI-

Canon 6A.

95. Canon 6C of the Code requires judges to report compensation they receive from the
extra-judicial and quasi judicial activities permitted by the Code. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 6C (1980). Unfortunately, the Code does not define compensation. A few states have
attempted to improve on the Code by including definitions of compensation as part of Canon 6
or as part of their reporting forms. Although there are slight differences, all of their definitions
would include income received for services rendered. Compare Mo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6 comment ("For purposes of this canon, 'compensation' does not include rent,
dividends or investment income.") and N.M. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6A which
states
Compensation is defined as being the consideration received for services rendered
to a person, firm, corporation or association other than the State of New Mexico.
It does not include income from interest, dividends, rents, royalties, working interests, proceeds of or profits from the sale or exchange of capital assets (as that
term is defined by the Internal Revenue Code and regulations) or collection of fees
earned or reimbursement of expenses incurred prior to judicial service.
with KAN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6A ("Compensation means income received

for the personal services of the judge in the amount of $100 or more from from any single payor.").
It is not clear, however, whether this attempt at definition represents substantial improvement. Compensation for services rendered could easily include a salary received as a teacher,
as well as a salary received as an employee of a permitted family business. Yet there are
differences in what is required of a judge who teaches and what is required of a judge who
works for a business, and these differences are reflected in the attitude of the Code toward the
two types of employment. Compare CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A and 5A (1980)
(permitting judges to speak, write, lecture, and teach on legal and non-legal subjects) with id.
at Canon 5C(1) and Canon 5C(2) (restricting judges from serving as officers, directors, managers,
or advisors of businesses and from other financial and business dealings that may compromise
their impartiality or interfere with or exploit the judicial office). These differences should be
paralleled in the Code's reporting requirements to keep better track of proscribed versus permitted activity.
The Code does not make a distinction between compensation received from activities permitted by Canons 4A and 5A, on one hand, and compensation received from investment and other
business activities not prohibited by Canons 5C(1) and 5C(2), on the other hand. Therefore,
income from salaries, whatever the source, is reflected in the part of the table dealing with
business income. A 'y" is used instead of an "x" when the jurisdiction requires disclosure of
investment income rather than simply compensation or income from services rendered. This
distinction underscores the significant differences that nevertheless exist between income from
investment and income from services rendered.
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ment income, Table 6 indicates that thirty-three jurisdictions require
judges to identify by name or industry the businesses with which they
are associated as an officer, director, partner, or shareholder. 6 Included among the thirty-three states are eight that do not require
judges to disclose investment income.Y
There remain about twenty jurisdictions that require business disclosure only under a provision requiring disclosure of compensation.
While "compensation" no doubt includes the receipt of salaries from
permitted activities, it seems to exclude both investment holdings
(particularly where they do not produce current income) and service
in offices or directorships. "Compensation" might even be read to
exclude interest, dividends, and capital gains. In these "compensation
only" jurisdictions large judicial holdings and deep judicial business
involvement may never be disclosed, at least during reporting periods
when no income, or unenumerated income, is generated. With slight
exception,9 these are all jurisdictions where the Code of Judicial Con-

96. Nevada and North Carolina require disclosure of income from business activities but
not officerships, directorships or ownership, making 35 jurisdictions that require disclosure of
business connections beyond compensation. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 281.571 (1987) (sources of
income); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (reporting of income in excess of $1,000).
97. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and West Virginia.
It should be noted that statutory business disclosure in West Virginia is extremely limited.
The only business involvement that must be disclosed, regardless of whether it involves ownership of stock or service as an officer or director, is involvement with businesses regulated by
the state. W. VA. CODE § 6B-1-1 (1987). West Virginia judges are also covered by the disclosure

provisions of the

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(1980) but this disclosure is subject to the

ambiguities in the definition of compensation under Canon 6C, see supranote 95 and accompanying text, as well as to the ambiguity of precisely what is intended to be in the phrase "gift,
favor, bequest or loan" in Canon 5C(4)(c)). See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
Although the South Carolina disclosure statute specifically applies to judges, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 8-13-850 (Law. Co-op. 1986), it is limited in its actual application to judges' business
activities because disclosure of offices and directorships is restricted to those transacting business
with the state, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-820(g)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986), or those regulated by
the agency with which the public officer is associated, see S.C. Statement of Economic Interests
(on file). Judges in South Carolina are also covered by the disclosure provisions of the Code,
but this disclosure is subject to the ambiguity of what is meant by the term "compensation"
and the phrase "gifts, favors, bequests or loans" in Canon 5C(4)(c). For further discussion of
these limitations, see supra notes 95 & 97 and accompanying text.
98. The exceptions include Hawaii, which requires disclosure of income for services rendered
by court rule; Rhode Island, which requires by statute disclosure of sources of occupational
income; and five dual provision states (Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and West
Virginia) which either limit disclosure of business income by statute to compensation, see, e.g.,
ARiK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3006(c)(3) (1979), or which do not require disclosure of business income
by statute, leaving the Code as the provision governing such disclosure.
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duct is the sole authority requiring disclosure.9 Since the Code also
requires judges to be aware of conflicts of interest and to disqualify
themselves from litigation where their financial dealings could present
a conflict of interest,' °° it is essential to require disclosure of at least
the sources and amounts of judges' investment income.
It is somewhat more understandable that the Code does not require
disclosure of service as an officer, director, consultant, or employee
of businesses, because a majority of Code states forbid judges from
engaging in such activities. It follows that those states that do allow
judges to work for businesses surely ought to require disclosure of
these activities. Even in strict '"no business" jurisdictions, however,
a spouse's service or employment should be disclosed because Canon
3C(1)(c) requires disqualification if a member of the judge's immediate
family has a financial interest in the litigation. The Code defines financial interest to include "a relationship as director, advisor, or other
active participant.'' 101
At root, it is anomalous to exempt forbidden activities from disclosure, because illegal or unethical conduct is precisely that which the
reporting laws are intended to expose. Disclosure forms should simply
allow judges to answer "none" to a question on business involvement
or other forbidden business conduct, or to check a box that indicates
that the question does not apply. Many states already utilize forms
that ask the person filing the report to answer "yes or no" to an initial
series of questions. The questions are keyed to the various categories

99.

The jurisdictions are Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-

shire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. In all
of these except New York, disclosure is required solely under the Code. In New York, disclosure

is required under the Code as well as an administrative order, but the administrative order is
virtually identical to the Code.
It should be noted that two of the "Code-only" states are not in this list because they have
amended their Code or reporting forms to include more extensive disclosure. See NEB. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring judges to fill out comprehensive disclosure statement adopted by Supreme Court); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C ("A judge

shall report the name and nature of any source or activity from which he received more than
$1,000 in income during the calendar year for which the report is filed.").
100. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(c) (1980).
101. Id. at Canon 3C(3)(c). Connecticut has apparently attempted to resolve the dilemma
of obtaining information about the financial holdings and activities of judges' spouses while

protecting to some extent the spouses' privacy by providing separate disclosure forms for judges
and their spouses. Judges' disclosure is to be made available to the public; spouses' disclosure
is to be placed in a sealed envelope and kept confidential and for the use of the supreme court
and judicial review council if the supreme court believes it is relevant to a judicial discipline
investigation. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(c) (West 1985).
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of financial disclosure. Any question answered "yes" requires the judge
to refer forward to a specified schedule to fill out the information
required. 02
B.

Real Estate

The Code of Judicial Conduct permits judges to hold and manage
real estate investments, so long as they avoid conflicts of interest and
the appearance of impropriety. 1°3 Financial disclosure laws often require judges to reveal information about their real estate holdings.
Table 5, which identifies the various sources of income judges must
disclose, indicates that twenty-seven jurisdictions require judges to
identify real estate that serves as a source of rents, capital gains, or
other income. With slight exception, these same states require disclosure of business investment income. 01° Nevertheless, the language of

102.

See, e.g., Cal. Form 721 Statement of Economic Interests (on file).

103. For a discussion of the permissible scope of real estate investment and management
activities by judges, see Lubet, supra note 39, at 28-30.
104. Hawaii requires disclosure of consideration received if property was transferred, but
not of investment income. Nebraska requires disclosure of real estate producing income but not
business income. Virginia, conversely, requires disclosure of business investment income but
not real estate income. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-600 & -614 (Supp. 1986). _
Further explanation of how Nebraska was categorized is necessary because the distinction
that resulted in placing Nebraska among the states requiring disclosure of real estate producing
income (and also trusts producing income) but not the states requiring disclosure of income from
business investment is technical. Generally states were considered to require disclosure of income
when the provisions required the disclosure of an amount of income from an investment, even
if the amount was only a range of income between two figures. E.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-14(a)(3)
(Supp. 1987). Some provisons, however, were worded to require disclosure of an investment
producing income without requiring disclosure of an amount of income. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 36-14-17(5) (Supp. 1987) (sources of trust income in excess of $1,000).
Categorizing the Nebraska provisions required drawing a fine line. Nebraska is one of the
states where the sole authority for financial disclosure is the Code. Unlike most Code states,
Nebraska has amended Canon 6C to add a requirement that judges file a financial interest
statement promulgated by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The statement promulgated by the
Court includes five substantive areas of disclosure: compensation, real property, gifts, other
financial interests and property, and creditors. See Neb. Judicial Financial Interest Statement
(on file).
In the instructions for the section on compensation, Nebraska states that 'Income
must ...be for services and does not include income, interest, or dividends received by reason
of investment." Id. Because of this definition Nebraska has not been included among the states
requiring disclosure of business investment income. See Table 5. It has, however, been included
among the states requiring disclosure of business ownership and activities, see Table 6, because
the section of the financial statement requiring disclosure of "other financial interests and property" asks judges to list institutions in which there are savings accounts and certificates of
deposit and issuers of stocks, bonds, and government securities. Id.
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the controlling provisions varies considerably from one jurisdiction to
another. Some jurisdictions, by requiring disclosure of net worth105 or
of all sources of income,1°6 implicitly include real property interests
that generate income. Other states specifically require disclosure of
real property interests that produce income,1 7 while still others limit
disclosure to income from the sale of real estate.108 Table 5 treats a
The section of the financial interest statement requiring disclosure of other interests and
property has a third subsection, in addition to the one asking for names of savings institutions
and issuers of securities. The third section asks for "other property owned or held for the
production of income ... [including] ...leaseholds and other interests in real estate... [and]
...beneficial interests in trusts and estates ... ." Id. This language places Nebraska among
those states requiring disclosure of real estate and trust income as well as ownership. This
placement is consistent with our categorization of other jurisdictions with provisions asking for
investments producing income rather than amount of income. Although the financial disclosure
statement appears to be asking simply for ownership in the section on "other financial interests
and property," this language about property held for production of income does not warrant
excluding the state from those requiring disclosure of income or income producing assets.
105. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.788 (Baldwin 1986).
106. E.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-27(f) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.571 (1986).
107. Alabama requires the address and fair market value of property held for investment
or revenue production, with the value to be specified by category rather than amount. ALA.
CODE § 36-25-14(a)(6) (Supp. 1987).
108. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542(A)(5) (1985) (requiring disclosure of transaction
in which purchase or sale was made); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5(g)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1980)
(requiring disclosure of name and address of person furnishing consideration upon transfer). But
qf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5813(a)(4)(b.) (1983) (excluding income from the sale of an officer's
residence).
Rents from real estate may be included under business income in these states but that is
not entirely clear. For example, the Massachusetts financial disclosure statement has a place
where officers must disclose property held for rent and/or investment. Mass. Statement of
Financial Interests, § K2 (on file). Furthermore, Massachusetts requires disclosure of business
income, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5(g)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1980). In Massachusetts "business"
means "any corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, firm, franchise, association, organization, holding company, joint stock company, receivership, business or real estate trust, or any
other legal entity organized for profit or charitable purposes." Id. Furthermore, in Massachusetts
"income" means
[I]ncome from whatever source derived, whether in the form of a fee, salary,
allowance, forebearance, forgiveness, interest, dividend, royalty, rent, capital gain,
or any other form of recompense or any combination thereof; provided, however,
that interest from savings accounts or from government obligations other than
those of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof or any public agency
or authority created by the general court, alimony and support payments, proceeds
from a life insurance policy, retirement or disability benefits, and social security
payments shall not be considered income for the purposes of this chapter.
Id. § 1(j). Given these definitions of business and income in Massachusetts, it may well be that
although the statutory language directly concerned with real estate is limited to sale, the source
of the financial disclosure statement's requirement that property held for rent and/or investment
be disclosed is the statute's definition of business and income rather than the part of the statute
that more directly covers real estate.
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jurisdiction as requiring disclosure where the controlling provision or
disclosure form calls for either the address of the income-producing

property or for the amount of income generated by the property.',"
Table 6 identifies the twenty-six jurisdictions that require disclosure of real property owned, rather than property that produces in-

come. Presumably more types of property would be reached by ownership provisions than by those limited to income production, since
the "ownership" provisions extend to property that has not yet begun
to earn income, property owned as a tax shelter, and property that
generates losses. 110 Twenty-two of the twenty-six states requiring disclosure of real property owned also require disclosure of real estate

income. Four states require only disclosure of property ownership."'
An additional five states, excluded from Table 6, require identification
only of income generating property."m
Six of the twenty-six jurisdictions included in Table 6 specifically
exclude the family residence from their disclosure requirements, 13
while six explicitly require a listing of the family residence, either

through a statutory provision,1 4 or a rule,"15 or instructions on the

109. As with disclosure of business income, disclosure of income from real property is almost
invariably by category. Rarely do the disclosure forms ask for specific amounts or values. But
cf. Fla. Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests (requiring exact amounts of income
over $1,000).
110. Most financial disclosure provisions predate the 1986 amendment of the tax laws and
have not been substantially amended since then. The amendment of the tax laws should not
directly affect disclosure requirements as long as judges continue to own the property. The
amendment may, however, have an indirect effect because it may result in judges divesting
themselves of property subject to disclosure.
111. The four states are Georgia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
112. The five states are Delaware, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
Although real estate management is often a business, eight states (Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia) that require disclosure of business ownership or directorships do not require disclosure of real estate ownership, and one
state (Nevada) requires disclosure of real estate ownership but not business ownership or
directorships.
113. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542(A)(5) (1985); CAL. GovT CODE § 87206(f) (West
1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.571(3) (1986); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A)(4) (Baldwin

1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-16(b)(3) (1984); Neb. Judicial Financial Interest Statement (on
file). Ohio and Arizona also exclude from disclosure property used primarily for recreational
purposes. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 38-542(A)(5) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A)(4)

(Baldwin 1984).
114. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-27(a) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4225(4)
(West 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-614(A)(1) (Supp. 1986) (repealed 1987).

115. See Order Adding Rule 15 to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii,
R. 15(d)(5) (Haw. Jan. 21, 1988) (on file).
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disclosure form. 116 Whether the family residence must be reported in
the remaining jurisdictions is uncertain. A number of states have a
space for a residence address on their disclosure forms, 117 including
states that do not generally require disclosure of property ownership. 1 "
Other jurisdictions request a business address on the forms,"" or request no address,120 or do not specify, evidently allowing the judge to
list either a home or an office address.Y'
It is not clear why so little consistency or clarity exists regarding
disclosure either of ownership or location of the family home. Some
states may consider the family residence to be within a zone of privacy
where the burdens of disclosure outweigh any benefits to be gained.
Perhaps other states failed to consider the issue at all. A judge's
ownership of a home is less likely to raise frequent conflicts of interest
than may business activities, nonetheless ownership of a family residence may conceivably require disqualification. For example, a case
might involve zoning or taxing the judges's own residence. The location
of a judge's home may also be relevant to interests other than real
estate ownership. For example, it may be necessary to know whether
the judge resides within a certain jurisdiction. Twelve jurisdictions
limit disclosure, whatever its nature, to property owned within the
state.'2 Judges are more likely to adjudicate disputes involving real
property within their state, but given the reality of modern long arm
jurisdiction a litigant might well need to know the location of a judge's
out-of-state property.

116. See Colo. Personal Financial Disclosure, § 3 (on file); Wash. Conflict of Interest Statement, § 2, Real Estate (on fie).
117. These include Alabama, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
Oddly, Rhode Island has a space for the family residence address on its disclosure form even
though the statute exempts the family residence from disclosure. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-16
(1984).
118. E.g., Iowa Report (on file).
119. E.g., Mo. Public Report of Extra-Judicial Income Pursuant to Rule 2, Canons 5 and
6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics (on file).
120. The rule form in Illinois asks for the position of the person filing but does not ask for
an address. Statement Required of Members of the Judiciary of the State of Illinois (on file).
Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-103 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (includes sample statutory
form with blank space for public officer to enter address to which notification of an examination
of statement should be set).
121. Del. Financial Disclosure Report (on file).
122. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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The better approach is to require disclosure of a judge's residence
unless the judge can demonstrate some unusual hardship. m A blanket
exclusion of such relevant information, and certainly the inconsistency
that exists in some places,2 and the ambiguity that exists elsewhere,2
is far less desirable.

Thirty-one jurisdictions require disclosure of either income from
real property, ownership of real property, or both. 12 6 Comparing the

source of authority for financial disclosure with the jurisdictions that
require disclosure of real estate interests, it is striking to note that
only four jurisdictions require reporting of real estate holdings pursuant to the Code of Judicial Conduct.'2 Since the Code allows judges

to hold and manage real estate for profit, and forty jurisdictions require
financial disclosure pursuant to the Code,m it appears to be a true

oversight that the codes in thirty-six jurisdictions

9

omit interests in

123. See the conclusion of this article for a suggestion of how states may provide for relief
from disclosure under certain circumstances.
124. In Rhode Island the disclosure statement has a place for the official's home address,
but the statute excludes the judge's residence from disclosure. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
125. In Delaware the blank space for the official's address does not specify whether a home
or business address is to be used. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. Twenty-two jurisdictions require disclosure of both: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal system. Five jurisdictions require disclosure of income but not ownership:
Delaware, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Four jurisdictions require
disclosure of ownership but not income: Georgia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
127. The jurisdictions are Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, and North Carolina. The disclosure
requirements in Illinois and Maryland come from detailed disclosure provisions that existed in
both states prior to their adoption of the Code. Each state, in adopting the Code of Judicial
Conduct, incorporated the prior existing disclosure provision into its Code of Judicial Conduct.
North Carolina presumably requires disclosure of income from real property under a provision
in Canon 6C which states: "A judge shall report the name and nature of any source or activity
from which he received more than $1,000 in income during any calendar year for which the
report is filed." N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C. Nebraska added to Canon 6 a
requirement that judges file disclosure forms prescribed by the state supreme court. The form
includes a place for disclosure of real estate holdings and real estate income.
128. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129. The number 36 reflects the number of jurisidictions that do not have a specific provision
in their Code of Judicial Conduct requiring disclosure of real estate income. This number may
be somewhat lower if account is taken of the two jurisdictions, Hawaii and Pennsylvania, with
court rules in lieu of the Code or the six jurisdictions that have Codes of Judicial Conduct
requiring judges to comply with state financial disclosure statutes. Four of these jurisdictions
require compliance with the state statute in lieu of specific reporting requirements of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. D.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C; OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 6C; TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6; WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/1

28

Rosenbaum and Lubet: Financial Disclosure by Judges: Functional Analysis and Critique
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY JUDGES

real property from otherwise obligatory disclosure. 130 While this inconsistency is resolved in some jurisdictions by parallel statutory provisions, it is still troublesome that the Code of Judicial Conduct allows
judges to engage in activities which generate income and may create
conflicts of interest, while exempting the same activities from public
disclosure.
C.

Trusts

Although judges may not serve as fiduciaries other than for the
estate of a family member, 131 they may place their assets in trust, or

be the beneficiaries of trusts established by others. Trusts in turn can
own and operate buinesses or hold and manage real estate. A judge's
relationship to a trust, therefore, has the same potential for creating
a conflict of interest as do personal business activities or property
holdings. This potential exists whether the judge serves as trustee or
receives income as a beneficiary.32
Ideally, then, judges should have to disclose interests in or relationships to trusts. However, Tables 5 and 6 reveal that this ideal is not
always met in practice. Table 5 indicates that twenty-five jurisdictions
require disclosure of income generating trusts. 13 Table 6 indicates that
twenty-three jurisdictions require disclosure of a judge's connections

to a trust as fiduciary or beneficial owner.134

CONDUCT Canon 6C. Two jurisdictions require compliance with the statute in addition to reporting requirements under the Code of Judicial Conduct. ALA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 6C; OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C. Cf. CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(c) (code section in state with no Canon 6C requiring reporting of gifts,
loans, bequests, and favors pursuant to statute).
130. Part of the problem is that the Model Code, adopted in most states without substantial
revision, requires disclosure of compensation, which, as discussed earlier, is typically defined
as income received for services rendered. This limitation of financial disclosure under the Code
to compensation is ill advised since it excludes not only investments such as stocks and bonds,
but also real estate investments.
131. For a discussion of the permissible scope of judges' fiduciary activities, see Lubet,
supra note 39, at 35-38.
132. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5D (1980).
133. This total includes states with a provision requiring disclosure of all sources of income,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A)(2) (Baldwin 1984), as well as states with a provision
defining business to include trusts, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-4-3(a) (1987), and presently
requiring disclosure of trust income along with disclosure of business income.
134. Included in this total are California, which defines business to include trust, CAL.
Gov'r CODE § 82005 (West 1987); Mississippi, which also defines business to include trust,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 254-3(a) (1987); and Montana, which also defines business to include trusts,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-102(12)(a) (1987). The forms which judges use in California for financial
disclosure clearly require disclosure of interests in trusts. Montana and Mississippi did not
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Thus, about half of all jurisdictions do not require any disclosure
about income from or connections to trusts. 135 As was true of disclosure
of business investments and real estate, a significant portion of the
non-requiring states are those where the Code of Judicial Conduct is
the only authority for disclosure. The Code requires disclosure only
of "compensation" received for non-judicial and quasi-judicial activities. 136 Compensation obviously includes fees received from service
as a fiduciary, but the Code prohibits judges from engaging in that
activity. 1 7 On the other hand, compensation may be read not to include
the identification of a beneficial interest, or even the payment of regular trust income. Ironically, then, the Code requires disclosure of
fees, even though there should be nothing to disclose, but apparently
excuses disclosure where income may actually be expected.
Because trusts are able to own or manage investments, businesses,
and real estate, the required disclosures for trusts would be expected
to parallel fairly closely the required disclosures for business and property interests. The disclosure laws meet this expectation to some
degree. Of the forty-nine jurisdictions that require financial disclosure,
twenty-three require disclosure of both trust and business income.as
Twenty one states do not require disclosure of trust or business in-

submit disclosure forms in response to our survey, and although the language of their statutes
would include disclosure of interests in trusts, it is not clear whether in practice such disclosure
is required.
Texas, which also defines "business entity" to include trusts, is not included, TEX. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9(b) § 2(11) (Vernon Supp. 1987), because business entity is used in the statute
not in the section on business disclosure, but in the section on disclosure of gifts. TEX. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9(b) § 4(c)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987) ("identification of any... business entity...
from whom the person or his spouse or dependent children received a gift of money or property
in excess of $250 in value or a series of gifts of money or property, the total of which exceeds
$250 in value received from the same source . .. ").
Connecticut requires the name of trusts "established by a judge for the purpose of divesting
himself or herself of all control and knowledge of his or her assets in order to avoid a conflict
of interest during his or her term of office. . . ." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(b)(1)(B)
(West 1985). Oregon requires disclosure of trusts on its supplemental form, see infra note 250.
135. Seven jurisdictions, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Texas, require disclosure of income but not ownership. See Tables 5 & 6.
Conversely, five jurisdictions, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, and West Virginia,
require disclosure of ownership but not income. See Tables 5 & 6.
136. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
137. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5D (1980). See also Lubet, supra note 39, at 35.
138. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the
federal system. See Table 5.
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come. 139 Three jurisdictions require disclosure of business income but
exempt trusts, 40 and two states require reporting trust income but

141
not business income.

139. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Table
5. Although these 21 jurisdictions have parallel requirements in the sense that none requires
disclosure of either business investment income or trust income, the lack of disclosure requirements primarily stems from the Code of Judicial Conduct being the sole authority requiring
financial disclosure. Because of limitations in the Code's definition of compensation, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text, none of these jurisdictions is considered to require disclosure
of investment income. If any of these jurisdictions adopts a statute or amends its Code to
specifically require disclosure of either business income or trust income (or both), presumably
that jurisdiction would fall into either the category of parallel requirements or the category of
non-parallel requirements by virtue of a specific provision, rather than, as here, by virtue of
the lack of a provision.
140. The jurisdictions are Delaware, Massachusetts, and Virginia. See Table 5.
141. The states are Nebraska and Rhode Island. See Table 5. Nebraska is included because
the financial disclosure statement requires identification of property held for the production of
income. It is excluded from business income because of the "compensation" definition. See supra
note 104.
There is a similar parallel between jurisdictions requiring disclosure of trust income and
those requiring disclosure of income from real property. Twenty-four jurisdictions require disclosure of both trust and real property income. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal system. Twenty-one jurisdictions do not
require disclosure of either. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. Three jurisdictions, Delaware, Hawaii, and Massachusetts, require disclosure of
income from real property but not trust income; and one, Rhode Island, requires disclosure of
income from trusts but not from real property.
Similar results occur when evaluating jurisdictions requiring disclosure of business ownership
or position with those that require disclosure of trust ownership; 24 jurisdictions require disclosure of both. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the federal system. Sixteen require disclosure of neither; the jurisdictions are Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Nine require disclosure of business activities but not trust activities. The jurisdictions are
Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
and Virginia.
Finally, comparing the jurisdictions that require disclosure of interests in real property to
those that require disclosure of interests in trusts, 20 require disclosure of both. The jurisdictions
are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
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The requirements for disclosure of information about trusts parallel
the requirements for disclosure of information about businesses and
real estate in only about half of the disclosure jurisdictions. Although
there are relatively few actual discrepancies, the reasons for this is
that anywhere from nineteen to twenty-three jurisdictions simply require no reporting in one or more of these areas. A jurisdiction's
failure to require any disclosure is, of course, more troublesome than
are differing requirements for real estate, trusts or businesses. All of
these are areas of endeavor which could present substantial conflicts
of interest for judges, and both failure to require disclosure as well
as inconsistencies in the requirements for disclosure run counter to
the purpose of financial reporting.
D.

Loans

Loans are not, strictly speaking, a source of income, but they do
represent an area of financial activity with a strong potential for creating conflicts of interest. Undesirable favoritism may exist when judges
receive loans on more favorable repayment terms or with more favorable interest rates than members of the general public. 142 Loans from
lawyers or parties suggest improper influence, if not outright bribery
or extortion.'4
Table 5 identifies jurisdictions that require judges to report information about outstanding loans.' 44 The table indicates that forty-four
jurisdictions require information about loans, creditors, or both. Although the number of states requiring disclosure is large, the extent
of required disclosure varies considerably. For example, forty-three

Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Wash-

ington, Wisconsin, and the federal system. Twenty require disclosure of neither; the jurisdictions
are Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New

Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming. Three require disclosure of trust interests
but not real property interests. The jurisdictions are Mississippi, Montana, and West Virginia.
Six require disclosure of real property but not trusts. The jurisdictions are Nevada, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
142. See Lubet, supra note 39, at 40-43.
143. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), vacated as to mailfraud conviction, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987).

144. Most jurisdictions require disclosure of loans to judges. A few also require disclosure
of loans judges make to others. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A(7) (1985). Rela-

tively few jurisdictions require disclosure of loans from judges to others because this type of
loan is less likely to create a conflict of interest or the appearance of favoritism than a loan
under which the judge is obligated to a third party.
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of the forty-four jurisdictions requiring disclosure of loan information
set minimums below which reporting is not required. 145 The minimums
range from as little as $100146 to as much as $10,000.147 Eleven of these
forty-three states have two different minimums, generally one set by
statute and another set by court rule.'4
States also vary in the items they exclude from disclosure. For
example, states exclude such items as the identity of the lender holding
the mortgage on the judge's family home, 149 the existence of automobile

loans,' the identity of creditors on retail installment contracts, 15 ' balances on revolving charge and credit card purchases, 152 and loans from
family members. 163
The exemption of loans from family members does not conflict with
the purposes of financial disclosure because judges are disqualified in
any event from hearing cases involving close family members either
as counsel or as parties in interest.'5 The exclusion of consumer debts

is more problematic. A probable reason for the exemptions is to give
judges a certain zone of privacy by avoiding disclosure of many finan-

145. See Table 7.
146. The minimum in the Code is $100, and since many states require disclosure of loans
through the provision in the Code requiring disclosure, $100 is the minimum most commonly
found.
147. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(4) (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A.(6),
(7) (1985) (business debts to controlled or dependent businesses constituting more than 30% of
the indebtedness to such business).
148. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Cal. Form 721 Statement of Economic Interests (Instructions for Completing
Schedule E) (on file); Pa. Statement of Financial Interest (Supplemental Instructions 08) (on
file). Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(A)(5) (Baldwin 1984) (exempting from disclosure
debts on property used primarily for recreation). But see Wash. Conflict of Interest Statement
(Liabilities and Creditors) (specifically requiring disclosure of lenders on home mortgages, second
mortgages, and home improvement loans) (on file).
150. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(4)(B) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A(6)
(1985).
151. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.241(1)(C) (Supp. 1987); Fla. Form 6, Full
and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests (Part B - Liabilities).
152. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order
Exhibit A(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Md. Order Promulgating Forms and Instructions with
Respect to Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements (Instructions for Completing Schedule F)
(1985) (on file). But see Colo. Personal Financial Disclosure (see Liabilities section requiring
disclosure of charge accounts and credit card balances above the statutory trigger) (on file).
153. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A(6) (1985); CAL. Gov"r CODE § 82030(b)(9)
(West 1987). The Code allows judges to accept loans from relatives and does not include such
loans among the disclosure provisions. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(b)-(c) (1980).
154. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(d) (1980).
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cial transactions that they undertake as part of their personal lives.
Judges may need to borrow money to buy items such as refrigerators
or furniture, and the fact of a judge's consumer debt will generally
1 Nonetheless, the breadth of the existbe of no great public concern. '5
ing loan exclusions does not appear to be well thought through.
The exclusion of financing information applies equally to private
and commercial loans. 1 Although a party to litigation might not care
that a judge's home mortgage is held by a bank that is on the opposite
side of the lawsuit, the situation would be very different if opposing
counsel were the judge's private mortgagee. The blanket exemption
for consumer loans may also serve to shield from disclosure all manner
of questionable or unethical practices, such as loans from attorneys
and litigants, 57 loans given on unusually favorable terms,1' defaults
or extraordinarily high levels of debt, and loans with exceptionally
sensitive terms, such as payment on demand. 159 It is not unheard of
for a putative private loan actually to be the vehicle for bribery or
extortion.16o
A blanket exclusion for any type of loan is simply overprotective
of judges. The zone of privacy that the exclusion evidently seeks to
protect can be achieved more rationally through the disclosure
minimums that most states already have in place. Although states
may want to reevaluate the amounts they use to trigger disclosure of
loans, 16' a figure of, say, $5,000, below which indebtedness need not
be revealed, would allow judges to make reasonable purchases in privacy, while still requiring disclosure of more excessive levels of in-

155.
156.

See Lubet, supra note 39, at 40-44.
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5(g)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1980).

157. The Code expressly prohibits judges from receiving loans from persons whose interests
come or are likely to come before him. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT Canon 5C(4)(c) (1980).

158. Although the Code allows judges to receive loans from lending institutions in the
regular course of business and on the same terms available to those who are not judges, this
provision is an exception to an overall prohibition against accepting loans unless specifically
permitted. Id. at 5C(4). But cf. In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979) (holding that
a judge who received favorable treatment from a bank through uncharged overdrafts and an

unsecured loan over $20,000 did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct because there was no
evidence the favorable treatment was made because he was a judge or that other good credit

risks would not receive similar treatment).
159. Regarding disqualification on the basis of indebtedness, see L. ABRAMSON, supra
note 49, at 62-63.
160. United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), vacated as to mail fraud conviction,
108 S. Ct. 53 (1987).
161. For example, the $100 minimum established by the Code may be low for loans, since

all major purchases will be above this minimum.
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debtedness that could compromise impartiality. In any event, disclosure should be required in all cases of loans from attorneys, litigants,
and others who come before the judge's court. '1
The information that must be disclosed concerning non-exempt
loans is affected to a large degree by the type of controlling provision
in the particular state. As noted earlier, forty-four jurisdictions require
some disclosure of loans or creditors. Of these, five jurisdictions require disclosure by statute alone, 16 twenty-seven require disclosure
by court rule alone (usually the Code of Judicial Conduct),164 and twelve
require disclosure by a combination of statute or constitution and court
rule.Ml
Where disclosure is required under two different provisions, the
terms of one may appear to neutralize the requirements of the other.
The most common conflict is in the minimums that trigger disclosure.
Eleven of the twelve jurisdictions requiring disclosure under multiple
provisions have one minimum, usually $100, set by court rule, and
another minimum, usually $1,000 or $5,000, set by constitution or
statute.'6 One jurisdiction, Nebraska, seems to impose conflicting requirements under a single court rule. Canon 5C(4)(c) of Nebraska's
Code of Judicial Conduct requires disclosure of loans in excess of $100,
but the form judges are required to fill out with their financial disclosure reports sets the trigger at $1,000.6

162. Such disclosure is required by court rule in Illinois. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A,
para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
163. The jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Kentucky, Texas, and Virginia.
164. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,

South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
165.

The jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,

Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal system.
166.

The eleven jurisdictions are Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,

Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal system. The remaining
jurisdiction, Alabama, has no conflict because it has no minimum. Oddly, one essentially single

provision jurisdiction also has a conflict. The Connecticut court rule, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
provides for disclosure of loans pursuant to statute. See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5C(4)(c). The statute in Connecticut, however, does not require disclosure of loans. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(b) (West 1985). Nebraska appears to have a similar conflict
under its court rule. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
167. Compare NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(c) (requiring disclosure of

loans in excess of $100) with Neb. Judicial Financial Interest Statement (requiring disclosure
of loans in excess of $1000) (on file).
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Thirty-six jurisdictions require disclosure of loans under the Code
of Judicial Conduct,'8 but the Code is very murky on its reporting
requirements for loans, leading to murky and inconsistent interpretations among the states. Loans are not mentioned in the general disclosure provisions of Canon 6. Rather, Canon 5C(4) addresses disclosure
of loans, stating first that certain loans are generally permitted, and
then that:
A judge or member of his family residing in his household
may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the
donor is not a party or other person whose interests have
come or are likely to come before him, and, if its value
exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the 69
same manner as
he reports compensation under Canon 6C.
Although this provision states that certain loans over $100 must
be disclosed, it may be read to exclude loans from lending institutions"
and even non-litigants.':' Whatever its meaning, this provision does
not seem to be enforced in practice. Eleven of the thirty-six Code
jurisdictions indicated on their responses to our survey that they do
require disclosure of loans.172 Five Code jurisdictions indicated in both
the answers to our questionnaire and on their official disclosure forms
that they do not require reporting loans under the Code of Judicial
Conduct. '7
The remaining twenty jurisdictions have language in Canon 5C(4)(c)
requiring disclosure of loans, but whether this provision is enforced
remains unclear. 74 These jurisdictions did not submit disclosure forms
168. See supra notes 165 & 166. This figure includes all of the twelve dual provision states
except Wisconsin, which has not yet adopted the Code, and all of the twenty-seven court rule
states except Hawaii and Pennsylvania, which requires disclosure under a special court rule but
not under the Code.
169.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(c) (1980) (emphasis added).

170. Id. at Canon 5C(4)(b).
171. Id. at Canon 5C(4)(c).
172. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota. Illinois also clearly requires disclosure of loans. The Administrative Office of the Courts declined to complete the
questionnaire because to do so would require an interpretation of the Supreme Court rules,
which it was not authorized to do. See Letter from Dennis Dohm to Michael Antonello (July
12, 1986) (on file). However, the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct when it was adopted effective
January 1, 1987, incorporated Supreme Court Rule 68 which had been promulgated effective
August 1, 1986 and plainly required disclosure of loans. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
68 and accompanying Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
173. The jurisdictions are Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Vermont.
174. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa,
Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and the federal system.
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used under the Code of Judicial Conduct, '71 though some sent the
forms used under disclosure statutes. Many of these jurisdictions indicated on their survey responses that disclosure of loans was not required. Those states answering that disclosure of loans was required
all have enacted additional statutes mandating disclosure. Thus, although it is probable that these jurisdictions do not require disclosure
of loans under the Code of Judicial Conduct, it is impossible to state
so with certainty.
The unclear and inconsistent treatment of loan disclosure may be
due to its placement in the Code. The requirement in Canon 5C(4)(c)
that loans over $100 be disclosed is included in a clause requiring
reporting of gifts, bequests, and favors. Some states have probably
emphasized the part of this Canon concerning gifts and donative behavior and simply overlooked the language on loans. Canon 6 covers
all other financial disclosure, and even though Canon 5(C)(4)(c) makes
reference to Canon 6, the reverse is not true. Therefore, some state
agencies appear simply to have overlooked Canon 5C(4)(c) in preparing
the disclosure forms which must be filed pursuant to Canon 6.
The conflicts and uncertainties regarding disclosure of loans under
the Code of Judicial Conduct could be resolved by a drafting change.
The provision for loan disclosure should be separated from the provision for gift disclosure, and loan disclosure should depend on a different
triggering amount. Because loans carry interest rates and must be
repaid, a $100 loan is likely to have little potential for affecting a
judge's impartiality. A gift of $100 is more likely to be regarded as
raising a conflict of interest. A minimum of $1,000 for reporting loans
would allow judges privacy in making customary consumer purchases,
but still capture most credit activity with a potential for creating
conflicts of interest.' 6s The requirement for disclosure of loans should
be moved to, or at least referenced in, Canon 6, so that all financial
information that judges must report is reflected in the specific canon
on financial disclosure.1'

175. Iowa did send its form, and the form indicated the judge was to comply with Canon
5C(4)(c). See Iowa Report (on file). However, in response to our survey Iowa indicated that
disclosure of loans was not required.
176. Loans that create actual conflicts of interest should be reported regardless of amount.
See supra note 162.
177. A similar recommendation is made for reporting of gifts, see infra note 191 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

E. Gifts, Honoraria,and Reimbursements
Gifts, honororia, and reimbursements are not income and, subject
to some limitation, judges are permitted to receive any and all of the
three. 17 On the other hand, questions of impropriety do arise where
gifts, honoraria, and reimbursements are abused, as when a judge
receives a benefit that is intended to exert overt or subtle influence.
Because of this potential for creating conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety, gifts, honoraria, and reimbursements present
another area where financial disclosure is appropriate.
As Table 5 indicates, forty-six jurisdictions require disclosure of
gifts, honoraria, or both.'7 The Code of Judicial Conduct plays an
extremely important role in this area.180 Disclosure of gifts, honoraria,
or both is required under the code of judicial conduct, either alone or
in combination with a statute, in all but seven of the forty-six disclosure
jurisdictions.18 1

178. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 5C(4)(a), (b), (c) & Canons 6A & B (1980).
See also Lubet, supranote 39, at 40-43 (discussion of financial activities permitted to judges).
179. The three that do not require disclosure of gifts or honoraria are Hawaii, Montana,
and New Jersey. See Table 5. Alabama does not have a specific provision requiring the reporting
of gifts or honoraria but indicates in its response to our survey that reporting is required;
evidently Alabama regards its provision requiring the reporting of all sources of income to
include gifts.
180. Disclosure of gifts is required under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1980) Canon
5C(4)(c) which provides:
[A] judge or member of his family residing in his household may accept any other
gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or other person whose
interests have come or are likely to come before him, and, if its value exceeds
$100, the judge reports it in the same manner as he reports compensation under
Canon 6C.
Id.
Most states requiring disclosure under the Code have this provision. Those that do not are
Alabama, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, which have deleted the reporting requirements of Canon 5C(4)(c) and Illinois and Maryland, which do not have Canon 5C(4)(c) but which
require gifts to be reported under a different provision.
Disclosure of honoraria would seem to be required under the part of the Code which states:
"A judge should report the date, place, and nature of any activity for which he received compensation, and the name of the payor and amount of compensation so received." Id. at Canon 6C.
It is not entirely clear whether disclosure of honoraria is included in this provision because
compensation is rarely defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct. See supra note 95. Although a
few jurisdictions define compensation, id., and this type of definition would include an honorarium
for giving a speech, it would be better for the states to be clearer on both their reporting forms
and in their definition of compensation precisely what they intend to be reported.
181. Twenty jurisdictions require reporting of gifts or honoraria solely under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The jurisdictions are Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico (honoraria only by Canon 6),
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Because the Code of Judicial Conduct is such an important source
of authority for disclosure of gifts and honoraria, it is essential that
it be completely clear as to the meaning of those terms. Unfortunately,
the Code does not define "gift" and "honorarium." For example, an
honorarium given for a speaking engagement would presumably be
considered compensation that must be reported pursuant to Canon
6C. On the other hand, the stipend attached to an unsolicited award,
such as the Nobel Prize, might more reasonably be viewed as a pure
gift. Unfortunately, neither the Model Code nor any of the state codes
that define compensation either specifically include or exclude honoraria from the definition of compensation for the purpose of Canon
6C.,12

The state statutes requiring disclosure of gifts tend to have fairly
specific exemptions from reporting. Examples of exemptions include
food, drink, and lodging in an individual's home,sa gifts from family
members,8 bequests, 1' wedding and shower gifts,'6 and books for

New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Wyoming, and West Virginia. Nineteen jurisdictions require reporting of gifts or honoraria by
both the Code of Judicial Conduct and by a statute. The jurisdictions are Alaska, Connecticut,
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and the federal
system. In Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, which have eliminated the reporting requirements of
Canon 5C(4)(c), the Code requirement applies only to honoraria under Canon 6. The remaining
seven jurisdictions that do not require reporting of gifts and honoraria under the Code include
Arizona, California, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. The seventh,
Alabama, has deleted the reporting requirements of Canon 5C(4)(c) and amended Canon 6C to
elininate the requirement that compensation be reported, but evidently requires the reporting
of gifts under the statutory provision requiring the reporting generally. See supra note 180.
It should be noted that the District of Columbia, Oregon, and Texas have amended Canon
6C, and Connecticut, which has deleted Canon 6C, has amended Canon 5C(4)(c) to require
reporting pursuant to statute, but the statutes in these jurisdictions do require reporting of
gifts or honoraria or both. Because the Code has been amended to conform with the statute in
these three jurisdictions they are counted among the jurisdictions that require reporting by the
Code as well as by statute.
182. The Code does not define "compensation" at all in Canon 6C. Although some states
do attempt a definition, see supra note 95, no state defines honorarium, or even includes it as
an example on the Code reporting form.
183. See, e.g., Cal. Form 721, Statement of Economic Interests (Instructions for Completing
Schedule F) (on file).
184. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(4) (1981); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, §
4(c)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
185. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-542(A)(8) (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
102.02(A)(7) (Baldwin 1984).
186. Md. Order Promulgating Forms and Instructions with Respect to Judicial Financial
Disclosure Statements (Instructions for Schedule D) (1985) (on file).
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official use. 1' The Code of Judicial Conduct, however, is not as clear
as to what must be reported and what may be omitted.
Canon 5C(4)(a) allows judges to receive complimentary books for
official use, invitations to professional functions, and gifts incident to
public testimonials. Canon 5C(4)(b) allows judges to receive ordinary
social hospitality, gifts, and bequests from family members, and wedding and engagement gifts. Finally, Canon 5C(4)(c) allows judges to
accept "any other gift, bequest, [or] favor . . . if the donor is not a
party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come
before him, and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the
same manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C." 111Since neither
Canon 5C(4)(a) nor Canon 5C(4)(b) contain a disclosure requirement
or reference to Canon 6C, presumably professional gifts, family gifts,
and social hospitality need not be reported. 189 While this result may
be intentional with regard to wedding presents and similar items, it
is anomalous with regard to bar association invitations and testimonials
where there is greater potential for abuse. 190 Once again, the amendment of Canon 6C to include all reporting required under the Code
of Judicial Conduct would be well-advised.' 9 '
As Table 5 indicates, thirty-seven jurisdictions require judges to
report reimbursement of expenses. This area, too, is affected to a
large degree by the Code of Judicial Conduct.'2 The requirement in
twenty-eight jurisdictions comes solely from the Code of Judicial Conduct, 93 and the requirement in an additional five jurisdictions comes
jointly from the Code and a statute. 94

187. Id.
188. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(c) (1980) (emphasis added).
189. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (requiring the reporting of "any" gifts including gifts of transportation,
food, lodging, and entertainment valued in excess of $250 and excluding only gifts between the
judge and a spouse, child, or parents).
190. See, e.g., In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972) (judge disciplined
for, among other things, receiving loans and going on junkets with bondsmen); In re Lawrence
417 Mich. 248, 335 N.W.2d 456 (1983) (judge disciplined for receiving free legal services from
lawyers who practiced before him).
191. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
192. Canon 6B provides 'Expense reimbursement should be limited to the actual cost of
travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion,
by his spouse. Any payment in excess of such an amount is compensation." CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 6B (1980). Reading Canon 6B together with the requirement of Canon 6C
mandating reporting of compensation indicates that excess reimbursement is compensation that
is to be reported under Canon 6C.
193. The jurisdictions are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
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It is uncertain why twelve disclosure jurisdictions do not require
reporting of reimbursements. Perhaps they proceed under a "wash"
theory, but a reimbursement, say for a trip to the Bahamas, could be
nothing more than a concealed "freebie." A reasonable trigger amount
would achieve the same goal while protecting against extravagances
and abuses. 19,
F. Miscellaneous Requirements
This section discusses a variety of disclosure requirements, each
of which is found in fewer than ten jurisdictions. These miscellaneous
requirements can be grouped in three categories: (1) those that should
be adopted more widely; (2) those that do not make sense as an area
for financial disclosure; and (3) those that are unique to the geographical or political environment of the jurisdiction in which they are found.
1. Appropriate and Necessary Requirements
Several jurisdictions require disclosure of information about assets
and activities that should be disclosed in every jurisdiction. For example, seven states require judges to report information about insurance
policies, pensions, or annuities. I9 Purchase of insurance, pensions, and
annuities can involve a substantial financial commitment, and ownership can be a substantial asset. In many ways these holdings are
indistinguishable from other financial instruments and investments.
Litigants would surely want to know whether a judge has such a
financial tie in cases in which the issuing company is a party, and
especially when the value of the holding could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding.1 9 In Code states it is contradictory
to require disqualification in certain cases on the basis of insurance
policies and the like,19 but not to require public disclosure of the
identical information.

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
194. The jurisdictions are Delaware, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Virginia, and the
federal system. The requirement in the remaining four jurisdictions, California, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin, comes solely from a statute.
195. See Minimums, Triggers, and Floors, infra Part V.
196. The jurisdictions are Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See Table 5. But cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3005(c)(1) (1979) (explicitly excluding
insurance policies from disclosure).
197. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(c) (1980).
198. Id. at Canon 3C(3)(c)(iii).
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Only eight jurisdictions require disclosure regarding professional
or charitable organizations which a judge serves in an official capacity,
for example, as an officer or director. 19 A judge's participation in
these organizations is certainly permissible under the Code of Judicial

Conduct, but such participation may raise conflicts of interest when

the organization, officers, directors, or staff appear before the judge.2
Consequently, disclosure of official positions in charitable, civic, professional, and fraternal organizations should be the norm.
Ten jurisdictions require disclosure of income or obligations from
former clients, 20 1 and three jurisdictions require disclosure of pending

litigation in which a judge is involved as a party. 20 2 Although these
may not be common areas of disclosure, they obviously have the po-

tential for raising conflicts of interest.m Thus, client obligations and
pending litigation should be disclosed in all jurisdictions.
2. Inappropriate or Unnecessary Requirements

Florida requires disclosure of the value of household effects.- Kentucky may require disclosure of the value of household goods as well,

through its provision requiring disclosure of net worth. 205 This disclosure unnecessarily intrudes on judges' privacy. The ownership of
household effects themselves is not likely to raise a conflict of interest,
and any indebtedness incurred to purchase them should be reported

as part of the disclosure of outstanding loans or liabilities. Several

199. The jurisdictions are Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Washington. See Table 6. In Illinois the statute includes such
positions if income above $1,200 is received. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-102(a)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The rule excludes unsalaried positions in religious, social, or fraternal
organizations. Id. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987). Kentucky exempts political, religious, and charitable organizations from which less
than $1,000 is received. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.740(1)(b) (Baldwin 1986).
200. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B comment (1980). See also L. ABRAmSON,
supra note 49, at 43-44.
201. The jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Oregon. See Table 5.
202. In New Jersey disclosure on interests in pending litigation is the only disclosure
required of judges. The other two jurisdictions are Illinois and Kentucky. See Table 5.
203. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
204. Fla. Form 6, Full and Public Disclosure, Part A - Assets. But see ALASKA STAT.
§ 39.50.030(a) (1987) (explicitly excluding household effects); Neb. Judicial Financial Interest
Statement, Item 5(c) (excluding household items) (on file); Wash. F-1, Conflict of Interest
Statement, General Instructions (excluding household items) (on file).
205. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61-788(1) (Baldwin 1986).
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jurisdictions specifically exclude household effects from disclosure,2
and this is the wiser approach.
Michigan and Oklahoma require disclosure of campaign income as
part of an annual financial report.207 Campaign income and expenditures are better handled outside of the judge's personal disclosure
report for several reasons. This type of disclosure should be made by
campaign committees to insulate judges as much as possible from
prohibited political activity,2 and particularly from direct involvement
in fund raising. Second, campaign disclosure will generally involve detailed and lengthy lists of contributions and expenses, which need not
be duplicated in annual financial reports. Finally, the separation of
campaign information from general financial information will facilitate
monitoring. The better approach is to treat campaign disclosure as a
matter entirely apart from financial reporting, as is done in most
jurisdictions.m
3. Requirements Unique to Particular Jurisdictions
Occasionally the geography, economy, or political environment in
a particular state will create the need for unique disclosure requirements. Alaska, for example, requires disclosure of natural resource
leases.210 Michigan allows part-time judges to practice law, and necessarily requires these individuals to disclose the income from their law
practices.211 Illinois has a provision requiring judges to disclose the
names of all lawyers with whom they are business partners, or who
have guaranteed loans on the judge's behalf, an obvious response to
22
the "Operation Greylord" scandal.
Some jurisdictions take unusual approaches to information that is
commonly required. For example, the federal system requires separate
disclosure of transactions, such as the purchase and sale of real estate
or stocks and bonds.213 Other jurisdictions require the same informa-

206.
207.

See supra note 204.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4202(11) (West 1987); Mich. Financial Report (1985)

(on file).
208. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt Canon 7 (1980).
209. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4100 to 4179 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-25
through -37 (1985).
210. ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(b)(8) (1987).
211. Mich. Financial Report, Instructions (1985) (on file).
212. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (SmithHurd Supp. 1987). See also United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), vacated as to
mailfraud conviction, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987).
213. 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(5) (1982).
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tion, but as part of overall business or real estate disclosure.?14 Similarly, Nebraska and Washington are the only states with special places

on their reporting forms for the disclosure of bank accounts, although
other jurisdictions capture this information as financial interests or

income,215 while others exclude it all together.
Finally, some state reporting requirements are simply unique, with
no apparent rationale. Arizona requires disclosure of business
licenses, 2 6 New Mexico uses the financial disclosure form to certify
compliance with the continuing legal education requirement,217 and

Tennessee requires disclosure of any bankruptcy declared within the
218
past five years.
V.

MINIMUMS, TRIGGERS, AND FLOORS

Many jurisdictions exempt otherwise required disclosures when
the amounts involved fall below a specified trigger. Table 7 indicates
these minimums as they concern general financial and business infor-

mation, real estate, fiduciary relationships, gifts, and reimburse9
ments.

21

A.

Businesses

As Table 7 shows, thirty of the thirty-three jurisdictions that require disclosure of business ownership or similar information have

identified minimums below which disclosure is not required.220 Seven
of these jurisdictions utilize a percentage approach, requiring disclosure if the judge's percentage of ownership is above a certain fraction,

ranging from as little as three percent22 ' to as much as fifty percent.2

The most common figure is ten percent.223 Seventeen jurisdictions

214. See, e.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b, § 4(c)(2) & (6) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
215. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l0A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
216. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-542A(9) (1985).
217. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-600D (1987) (Code of Judicial Conduct).
218. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-502(8) (1980).
219. Trigger amounts for disclosure of loans is discussed supra in Section IV.D.
220. Of the three jurisdictions that do not set minimums, two jurisdictions, South Carolina
and District of Columbia, require only disclosure of officerships and directorships and not ownership of stocks and bonds. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(2) (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §
8-13-820 (Law. Co-op. 1986). The other state, Maryland, sets no minimum and presumably
requires disclosure of any interest.
221. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-614(2) (Supp. 1986).
222. E.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b § 4(c)(9) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
223. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-27(e)
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.2 4 1(l)(g) (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 6B-1-1(1) (1987).
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require disclosure if the value of ownership exceeds a specified dollar
amount, ranging from as little as $100,224 to as much as $10,000.22 The
majority set the minimum at $1,000.-6 In addition to the jurisdictions

that establish minimums by a percentage of ownership and those that
set minimums by a dollar amount,227 seven jurisdictions use alternative
triggers, requiring disclosure when the value of ownership exceeds
either a specified dollar figure, usually between $500 and $5,000, or
a percentage of ownership, usually between five and ten percent.22 9
Of the twenty-six jurisdictions that require disclosure of investment
income, twenty-two set minimums below which disclosure is exempt.m°
Most name a dollar figure ranging from as little as $100,2 1 to as much
as $10,000,2 with the majority using $1000 as the disclosure point.23
One jurisdiction requires disclosure over a percentage of gross in-

224.
225.

E.g., Wis. Sup. CT. R. 60.18(2).
E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33.2.1-8-8(7) (West Supp. 1987).

226. The jurisdictions are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and federal system. See Table 7. The $1,000 limit in Montana can be
found in the statutory definitions rather than in the substantive disclosure requirements. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-102(12)(a) (1987).
227. Although 30 jurisdictions set minimums, adding together the 7 jurisdictions that use
"percentage of ownership," the 17 that use income, and the 7 that use alternate triggers totals
31. The reason for the apparent discrepancy is that Wisconsin has two triggers, one set by
statute and one by court rule. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.44(1)(b) (West 1986) (setting
statutory minimum below which disclosure is not required at $5,000) with Wis. Sup. CT. R.
60.18(2) (setting minimum at $100).
228. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-50(b)(3)(B) (Harrison 1987) (setting dollar figure of alternate
trigger at ownership valued at $20,000 fair market value).
229. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-502(2) (1980) (requiring disclosure of business investments in excess of $5,000 or 5% in total capital).
230. The four jurisdictions that do not set minimums are Colorado, which requires disclosure
of sources of income but sets no amounts, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-202(2)(a) (1982); District of
Columbia, which requires disclosure of business income under a provision requiring disclosure
of all sources of income and sets no minimums, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(1) (1981); Maryland,
which has no minimum, Order Promulgating Forms and Instructions with Respect to Financial
Disclosure Statements (Md. Dec. 12, 1985) (on file); Tennessee, which also requires disclosure
of sources of income but does not require amounts, TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-502(1) (1980).
231. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(b)(1) (1987) (provision requiring disclosure of all
sources of income in excess of $100); 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(1)(A) & (B) (1982) (provisions
requiring disclosure of sources of income over $100 and dividends, rents, interest, and capital
gains over $100).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-6141(4) (Supp. 1986).
233. The jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Table 7. In Connecticut the requirement
applies only to spouses and minor children, not to judges. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5146a(b)(2)(B) (West 1985).
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come,2 and another requires disclosure over either a percentage of
total income or a specified amount.2 Four jurisdictions have also set
minimums for disclosure of compensation, salaries, or both.23
Wisconsin and Illinois have extensive court rules and additional
statutes requiring financial disclosure by judges. In both states there
is a discrepancy between the base figure under the rule and the base
figure under statute. In Illinois, the court rule sets no base figure
and presumably requires disclosure of ownership interests or income,
however slight.3 The Illinois statute, on the other hand, does not
require disclosure of equity under $5,000, of dividends or service as
an officer if valued under $1,200, or of capital gains or permitted
professional services valued under $5,000.m In Wisconsin the court
rule requires disclosure of income and equity valued over $100.3 The
statute, on the other hand, does not require disclosure of income unless
it exceeds $1,000,m nor equity unless it exceeds $5,000 in value or a
ten percent interest.2 1

234. NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.571(2) (1986) (provision requiring disclosure of sources of
income constituting 10% or more of gross income).
235. OR. REV. STAT. § 244.060(3) (1985) (requiring disclosure of sources of income producing

more than 10% of total annual income), § 244.070(1) (requiring disclosure of sources of income
over $1,000 if the economic interest is derived from an individual or business which has been
doing business, does business, or could be expected to do business, or has legislative or administrative interests in the government agency of which the public official is a member or over
which the public official has authority).
236. Nebraska and North Carolina set a $1,000 minimum under their Code of Judicial
Conduct. See NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring filing of Judicial Financial
Disclosure Statement); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring disclosure of
sources or activities generating more than $1,000 in income). North Dakota sets a $100 minimum
under its Code of Judicial Conduct. See N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (requiring
disclosure of sources of compensation in excess of $100). Rhode Island sets a $1,000 minimum
by statute. See R.I. Yearly Financial Statement (setting $1,000 minimum for disclosure of
sources of occupational income) (on file). But cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-16(b)(2) (1984) (requiring
disclosure of sources of occupational income but not setting $1,000 minimum).
237. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (SmithHurd Supp. 1987) (Code of Judicial Conduct).
238. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-102(a)(1), (2), (3) & (b)(1), (2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987).
239. Wis. Sup. CT. R. 60.18(2).
240. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.44(e), (f) (West 1986). See also Wis. Statement of Economic
Interests, Schedules F & H (on file).
241. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.44(b) (West 1986) (securities over $5,000 in value), § 19.44(f)
(family owned businesses or ownership of 10% or greater share).
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In total, thirty-two jurisdictions out of the thirty-five that mandate
reporting of investment income, equity, or both24 set a floor for the
required disclosures.m Twenty-nine of these jurisdictions have enacted
the Code of Judicial Conduct in whole or with amendments,2m and the
use of a base figure therefore creates some tension with the disqualification requirements of Canon 3C.m According to Canon 3(C)(1)(c),
a judge is disqualified if the judge or any member of the judge's family
has a "financial interest" in the proceeding. According to Canon
3(C)(2)(b), a financial interest includes an ownership interest, however
small, or service as a director, advisor, or active participant.246 Thus,
in all twenty-nine "trigger" jurisdictions operating under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, there is a range where disqualification is required
to avoid the appearance of impropriety, but where disclosure of potentially disqualifying financial conflicts of interest is excused because
such interests are below the reporting minimum.

242. The 35 figure is derived from the 33 that require disclosure of equity plus Nevada
and North Carolina which require disclosure of income but not of ownership or directorships.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
24.
There are no base figures in South Carolina, which requires disclosure of only directorships. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-820(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986). There are no base figures in the
District of Columbia, which sets no minimums on the disclosure of income, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1530(a)(1) (1981), or on the disclosure of businesses in which judges serve as officer, director,
or partner, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(2) (1981). There are also no minimums in Maryland,
which provides no minimums on its financial disclosure statement. Order Promulgating Forms
and Instructions with Respect to Financial Disclosure Statements (Md. Dec. 12, 1985) (on file).
Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987) (court rule on financial disclosure providing no minimums), ch. 127, para. 604A-102
(statutory disclosure setting minimums).
244. The Code has not been enacted in Montana, Rhode Island, or Wisconsin.
245. Only 3 of the 29 jurisdictions require financial disclosure by court rule. In Pennsylvania
disclosure is required by special court rule. In re Financial Disclosure and Reporting Requirements for Judicial Officers, No. 47 (Pa. Apr. 13, 1984) (on file). In Nebraska disclosure is
required by the Code of Judicial Conduct. NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C
(requiring judges to file Judicial Finanical Interest Statement). In Hawaii disclosure is required
by court rule. Order Adding Rule 15 to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Hawaii (Haw. Jan.
21, 1988) (on file). The tension in these states is between two court rules with somewhat
conflicting requirements as opposed to between statute and court rule.
246. Although most of the base figures are fairly low, a few, such as 50% ownership in
Texas or $10,000 income in Virginia, are so high that a serious unreported conflict could easily
exist. Indeed, even though the Texas and Virginia exemptions are extreme, it is quite possible
that the common 10% ownership figure could defeat the purpose of disclosure. Impartiality
obviously would be questioned where a judge owns a 5% interest in a large concern that is the
subject of litigation.
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B.

Real Estate
Minimums for the disclosure of real property interests may be
expressed either in terms of income or underlying value. As Table 7
shows, sixteen of the twenty-seven jurisdictions that require disclosure
of income generated by real property also set minimums that trigger
disclosure.247 These triggers range from as little as $100m to as much
as $5,000, 249 with most states setting the minimum at $1,000.25 Presumably the states without triggers require disclosure of the interest when
any income is received, however slight. Although these minimum income figures are all fairly low, the use of any triggering amount is
unwise. Property held by a judge can create a conflict of interest or
the appearance of impropriety even where it produces current income
below the minimum, or indeed generates a loss.251
Seventeen jurisdictions out of those requiring disclosure of property
ownership? set a minimum based on underlying value. These values
range from as little as $500,m to as high as $10,0002 4 or even $20,000,25
with most states setting the minimum at $1,000.A These minimums,
except the two at the very high end, are slightly less problematic.

247. Only capital gains must be disclosed in Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §
5813(a)(4)b. (1983) and by statute in Illinois. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-102(a)(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). Cf. ILL. AiNN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Adminstrative Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (Code of Judicial Conduct provision requiring disclosure of
economic interests which though not defined by the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct presumably
includes disclosure of real estate that produces other income in addition to capital gains).
248. E.g., 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(1)(B) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(b)(1) (1987).
249. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-102(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1987). The minimum is
set by statute; no minimum is required by court rule.
250. The jurisdictions include Delaware, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See Table 7. In addition, Oregon requires a supplemental disclosure statement
of sources of income over $1,000 other than those disclosed on the statement of economic interest
when the source of the interest is derived from an individual or business which has been doing
business, does business, or could reasonably be expected to do business with or has legislative
or administrative interest in the government agency of which the public official is a member or
over which the public official has authority. OR. REV. STAT. § 244.070(1) (1985).
251. See supm notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
252. See Table 6. The Oregon minimum is on the supplemental form. See supranote 250.
253. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 39.50.030(a) (1987).
254. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(6) (1981).
255. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-50(b)(3)(B) (Harrison 1987). Georgia alternatively requires
disclosure of ownership interest in real property representing at least 10% of the officer's net
worth. Id.
256. The jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
Oregon, and the federal system. See Table 7.
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First, the use of ownership value rather than income avoids the problem of undisclosed interests in non-cash generating properties. Second,
since real estate tends to be relatively expensive, an investment worth
less than $1,000 is very likely de minimis.
Nonetheless, even an interest that seems nominal on its face could
present a judge with a substantial conflict, if for example, the outcome
of a zoning or condemnation case could signficantly increase the value
of unrelated property owned by the judge.2 7 Furthermore, ownership
of even a de minimis interest in property that is the subject of litigation requires recusal under the Code of Judicial Conduct.m Thus, even
though the rationale behind using minimum property values may be
easier to defend in theory, a wiser practice for capturing potential
conflicts of interest would be to eliminate all minimums and simply
require disclosure of real estate ownership regardless of the value.
C.

Trusts

As Table 7 indicates, fifteen of the twenty-five jurisdictions that
require reporting of trust income set disclosure minimums, ranging
from as little as $100 to as much as $10,000. Similarly, fourteen of
the twenty-three jurisdictions that require reporting of trust ownership set minimum reporting values, ranging from $100 up to $1,000.
Our earlier statements about income from and ownership of businesses
and real property are equally true of trust income and ownership: the
higher the minimums for disclosure the more information may be omitted (or concealed) that could present a conflict of interest.
Interestingly, only about half of the jurisdictions utilize triggers
for reporting trusts, while nearly all have floors for business disclosure.
If the absence of a minimum is not an oversight and actually means
that the jurisdiction intends the disclosure of all interests in trusts,
this may reflect a perceived need for greater disclosure of indirect
ownership. Trust holdings are less public than other assets, and "secret
trusts" have often been regarded as instruments of concealment. Thus,
a bias against trusts may also operate within the disclosure laws. It
may also be, however, that since trusts are encountered relatively
infrequently among judges, the establishment of triggers was simply
overlooked or viewed as unimportant.

D.Gft
As Table 7 indicates, forty-three jurisdictions have set minimums
below which gifts or honoraria need not be reported. The minimums
257.

See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii) (1980).

258. See id. at Canons 3C(1)(c), (3)(c).
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range from $35 to $500,- 9 with the vast majority at $100 in accordance
with Canon 5C(4)(c). Even where provisions are inconsistent, as in
Wisconsin where the minimum is $50 by statute and $100 by court
rule, 260 the triggers are generally so low that the differences are of
no great consequence. 261
Often a single statute or rule sets different reporting amounts for
different types of gifts. For example, the federal statute generally

requires reporting of gifts over $35 in value, but gifts of travel, food,
and lodging require disclosure only for amounts over $250.2 Similarly,
the Illinois rule sets a trigger of $100, but again, gifts of travel, food,
and lodging are exempted below a minimum of $250.26 The reason for

this distinction is not clear. Perhaps gifts of travel, food, or lodging
are somewhat less likely to reflect poorly on a judge's impartiality,
or perhaps they are sufficiently difficult to value that a higher floor
is considered acceptable. 26

259. E.g., 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(2)(A) (1982) ($35 limit); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
102.02(A)(7) (Baldwin 1984) ($500 limit). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.241(f) (Supp.
1987), § 42.17.020(8) (requiring reporting of compensation over $500 and including honoraria in
definition of compensation). See Wash. Conflict of Interest Statement (Income, Employment &
Compensation) (requiring reporting of honoraria) (on file). Some jurisdictions do not specify a
minimum in their statutes. In these jurisdictions it is not clear whether all gifts are to be
reported or whether, especially in those jurisdictions where gifts are defined as income, see,
e.g., Alaska Public Officers Commission, Manual of Instructions; Statement of Conflict of Interest Law (Part 3 - Sources of Income or Capital Gains over $100.00) the minimum for gifts
is considered to be the same as the minimum for sources of income generally.
260. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.44(g) (West 1986) (setting $50 trigger) with Wis.
Sup. CT. R. 60.18(5) (setting $100 trigger).
261. The highest trigger is in Washington, which sets $1,000 as the minimum. See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.020(8) & 42.17.241(f) (Supp. 1987) (compensation trigger with compensation defined to include honoraria). See also Wash. Conflict of Interest Statement, Instructions for Income, Employment and Compensation (requiring honoraria in excess of $1,000 to be
reported as income). This high trigger does not present a conflict in Washington, since honoraria
would ordinarily be reported under the provision requiring reporting of compensation in Canon
6C which sets no trigger, but in Washington Canon 6C expressly defers to the state statute,
which requires reporting of honoraria but not gifts. The only requirement in Washington requiring reporting of gifts over $100, comes from the Code of Judicial Conduct. WASH. CODE OF
JUDIcmL CONDUCT Canon 5C(4)(c).
262. 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(2)(A) (1982).
263. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 68 and accompanying Administrative Order (SmithHurd Supp. 1987).
264. E.g., compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(4) (1981) (setting trigger for gifts at $50)
with D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(a)(7) (1981) (setting trigger for honoraria at $300).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/1

50

Rosenbaum and Lubet: Financial Disclosure by Judges: Functional Analysis and Critique
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY JUDGES

E. Reimbursements
Relatively few jurisdictions set specific minimums for reporting
reimbursement of expenses, since the Code of Judicial Conduct requires disclosure only where the reimbursement exceeds actual expense.2 r Five jurisdictions, Delaware, Massachusetts, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the federal system, do have statutory provisions with
minimums ranging from $50 to $1,000.2, Oregon and Wisconsin do not
conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct because Wisconsin has not
adopted the Code and Oregon does not require reporting of compensation under the Code. The remaining three may have conflicting
reporting requirements in those cases in which an excess over actual
expenses is still below the minimum for disclosure. Any discrepancy,
however, would necessarily be minimal in Massachusetts and the federal system, where the triggers are $100,7 and $250.2S In Delaware,
where the trigger is $1,000,2 9 the discrepancy is more significant
though still not large.
VI.

PUBLIc DISCLOSURE

States vary as to how, and to what extent, judges' disclosure
statements will be made public. This information is contained in Table
8, which records that forty-five jurisdictions have provisions authorizing the information in the reports to be made available to the public. 0°

265.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6B (1980).

266. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.56(2)(a) (West 1986) (report over $50) with DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5813(a)(4)c. (1983) (report over $1,000). Cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.56(3)
(West 1986) (reporting not required if honorarium or reimbursement is received for an activity
accomplished without use of state time, facilities, supplies, or services).
267. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5 (g)(4 ) (Law Co-op. 1980).
268. 28 U.S.C. app. § 302(a)(2)(C) (1982).
269. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5813(a)(4)c. (1983).
270. The remaining four jurisdictions differ in their treatment of public access. Connecticut
requires two separate reports to be filed, one for judges and one for their spouses and dependents.
The report for the family members is confidential and may be used by the Judicial Review
Council and Connecticut Supreme Court only when relevant to a disciplinary investigation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a(c) (West 1985). In the District of Columbia the information
on officerships, directorships, and partnerships in businesses, professional organizations, and
charities is made public. All other information is kept confidential; it is available only to the
judge who filed the report and the authorized representatives of the judicial discipline system.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530(b)(1), (2) (1981). The report filed in Maine pursuant to Canon 6C
of the Code of Judicial Conduct is kept confidential, ME. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
6C, and the administrative order in New Jersey requiring the filing of a report on pending
litigation does not indicate whether the information is to be released tp the public. Memorandum
from Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges (July 12, 1982) (on file).
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Where filing is required under more than one authority, the two

provisions often conflict with each other, with one provision requiring
that all information be available to the public and another provision
requiring that at least some information to be kept confidential. In

Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma the statutory form is public, but
the Code form is confidential unless a conflict of interest is believed
to exist and a request is made for public disclosure.21 In Florida the
form filed pursuant to the constitution is public, as is the Code form

listing gifts; the Code form listing business associations, however, is
only made public upon request when a conflict of interest in believed
to exist. 2 Finally, in Kentucky, where two statutes require disclosure

of similar but not identical information, one statute provides for full
confidentiality and another provides for full public release.'7
The vast majority of jurisdictions require that financial disclosure
reports be available to the public. This comports with the underlying
purpose of reporting requirements. It is difficult to understand the
rationale for requiring reports without making them available. Short
of a comprehensive system of administrative monitoring and cross-

checking, the surest protection against conflicts of interest is scrutiny
by interested parties.
A different problem is caused by the provisions in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts, that allow judges to receive copies of all requests for their financial disclosure reports.- A lawyer or litigant

should be entitled to inspect a judge's disclosure statement anony-

271. Compare ALA. CODE § 36-25-4(5) (Supp. 1986), GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-53 (Harrison
1987), and OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 74, § 4206(5) (West 1987) (requiring public disclosure) with
ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 60 (disclosure of financial interests), GA. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C, and OKLA. CODE OF JUIDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C
(providing for confidential disclosure unless a conflict of interest is believed to exist and a
request is made).
272. Compare FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(a), (b) and CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
6B (1980) with FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C.
273. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.750 (Baldwin 1986) (public) with KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 61.790 (Baldwin 1986) (confidential).
274. In Illinois, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts disclosure is public, but the judge is permitted
to know the identity of each person who examines the report. The statute and rule in Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-106 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987), ch. 110A, para. 68 and
accompanying Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); the statutes in Massachusetts,
MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 3(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); in Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.48(8) (West 1986) provide that when a request for a judge's financial disclosure report is
made, a copy of that request is sent to the judge.
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mously. Although judges may have some interest in knowing who has
requested their reports, the effect of this rule is necessarily to chill
public access.
Of course, all conflicting provisions on confidentiality make no sense
and should be eliminated. In the five jurisdictions that have dual
provisions, the rule allowing broader public access obviously swallows
the narrower rule. The purpose of financial disclosure is best accomplished, and judges' confusion is best eliminated, by amending or
eliminating the more restrictive provisions.
VII.

PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT

Judges can fail or refuse to comply with the requirements of financial disclosure laws in three ways: they can neglect or refuse to file
their disclosure reports; they can file incomplete reports; or, they can
file false or misleading reports. If financial disclosure is to be effective
in revealing actual or potential conflicts of interest, some mechanism
must exist to ensure that judges complete their reports regularly and
in good faith. Enforcement is improved when the penalties for noncompliance are adequate and actually are applied to those who refuse
to comply with the financial disclosure laws.
Table 9 identifies the various sanctions available for securing compliance with the requirements of the financial disclosure laws. As the
table indicates, most states have more than one sanction available.
The Code of Judicial Conduct does not specify particular penalties,
but the statutes in many jurisdictions do specify a range of penalties,
though they do not necessarily specify the circumstances under which
any particular sanction is to be applied.
In twenty jurisdictions a fine may be imposed for noncompliance.
Sometimes the fine is $10 a day up to a stated maximum, 27 5 and
sometimes the permissible fine is given without daily accrual as an
amount within a particular range.1' 6 Eleven jurisdictions provide for
a possible term of imprisonment for noncompliance. Usually the
maximum term is less than six months, particularly in those states
where noncompliance is treated as a misdeameanor.27 Some states,
however, provide for longer terms when noncompliance is treated as
a felony or perjury.-' 8 Other sanctions include forfeiture of salary,

E.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25-27(a)(2) (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.135 (1987).
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-202(7) (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(2) (1987).
E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.060 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-544 (1985).
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-9(a) (Harrison Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 268A,
§ 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
275.

276.
277.
278.
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censure or reprimand, forfeiture of the right to or eligibility for office,
restitution of any benefits received, payment of late fees, suspension

without pay, and issuance of a "cease and desist" order to compel
filing. Three jurisdictions treat noncompliance as perjury;27 seventeen

treat noncompliance as a misdemeanor;2 and four treat noncompliance
as malfeasance or misconduct in office.281 One jurisdiction makes willful
falsity a felony,2 and one jurisdiction makes a second offense a

felony.2 Finally, twenty-one jurisdictions state, either in response to
our survey or in their statutes, that noncompliance is treated as a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and referred to the jurisdic-

tion's judicial conduct organization.2
It is considerably easier to identify the available sanctions than it
is to discover whether any of the penalties are actually used to enforce
compliance with the financial disclosure laws. We have found no case
where a judge has been sanctioned solely for violating a state financial

279. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.020(a) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-46a (West
Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5(f) (Law. Co-op. 1980).
280. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.060 & 110 (1987); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-544 (1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3007 (1979); CAL. GOV'r CODE § 91000 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-6-202(7) (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5815(a) & (b) (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-9(a)
(Harrison Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 604A-107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-4-31(3) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(1) (1987); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 281.581 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.99(A) & (B) (Baldwin 1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 74, § 4226 (West 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8 13-1010 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TEX. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9b, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-639.17 (1987); W. VA.
CODE § 6B-1-2 (1987).
281. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3007 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1530 (1981); FLA.
STAT. § 112.317(4) (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-639.19 (Supp. 1986).
282. MISS. CODE ANN. § 254-31(2) (1987).
283. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-9(b) (Harrison Supp. 1987).
284. Of the 21 jurisdictions that treat noncompliance as a matter of judicial discipline only
Illinois and Maryland do so as part of the financial disclosure required by the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and it is interesting to note that both of these states had a rule requiring financial
disclosure before they adopted the Model Code. Hawaii and Pennsylvania impose their penalties
via court rule rather than the Code of Judicial Conduct. Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Oklahoma, and California have statutes which defer to the judicial conduct organization
on matters of noncompliance with financial disclosure. The remaining 12 jurisdictions, Colorado,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia, stated in response to our survey that noncompliance
would be treated as a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but have no specific provision
so stating. Presumably other jurisdictions where the Code of Judicial Conduct requires financial
disclosure would also refer noncompliance to the judicial conduct organization. No specific penalty
for noncompliance with financial disclosure provisions is stated in the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.
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disclosure statute. The absence of cases may mean that judges are
complying fully with the statutes. It may also mean that judges are
not complying, but that the states have defaulted on enforcement.
Finally, it may be that every case has been resolved by compliance,
admission, or dismissal before reaching a stage that could result in a
published opinion.25
There are a few non-statutory cases that involve judges' refusal
to comply with the financial disclosures required by the Code of Judicial
Conduct or other court rules. State supreme courts tend to be more
directly involved in the imposition of judicial disepline for violations
of the Code or other ethics provisions,2 and this increases the likelihood of a reported opinion. These cases fall into three categories: (1)
cases in which failure to file was included among numerous other
charges of misconduct, and was not separately discussed or disciplined
by the court;2 7 (2) cases in which the judge engaged in misconduct
that was concealed by nonreporting or misreporting, and the court
focused more on the underlying misconduct than on the failure to
reveal it in the financial disclosure statement;m and, (3) cases in which
failure to file a financial disclosure report was the sole misconduct
treated in the decision.2
While it is not possible to generalize from the limited universe of
reported opinions, it is interesting to note that only three jurisdictions
(Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Maryland) appear to have disciplined
judges solely for failure to comply with financial disclosure requirements. Two of these states, Wisconsin and Maryland, have had detailed
and specific financial disclosure rules for more than ten years and
utilize clear and comprehensive forms that must be filed pursuant to

285. See Lubet, The Search for Analysis in JudicialEthics, or Easy Cases Don't Make
Much Law, 66 NEB. L. REV. 430, 438-39 (1987).
286.

JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNING PROVISIONS (K. Sampson ed.

1984).
287. In re Durr, 1 Ill. Ct. Comm. 13 (1973); In re Lawrence, 417 Mich. 248, 335 N.W.2d
456 (1983); In re Katz, Unreported Determination (N.Y. Conm'n on Jud. Conduct 1984). See
also Lubet, supra note 285.
288. In re Welch, 283 Md. 68, 388 A.2d 535 (1978); In re Scachetti, Unreported Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct 1981).
289. In re Hormes, 291 Md. 673, 436 A.2d 457 (1981); In re Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d
997 (1987); In re Guay, 101 Wis. 2d 171, 303 N.W.2d 669 (1981); In.re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508,
235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
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court rule.290 Pennsylvania also has clear and specific forms, but its
promulgation of the forms is more recent.291
In any event, it appears that most states do not make enforcement
of their financial disclosure laws a high priority. We are aware of no
state that engages in random audits, much less comprehensive monitoring, of the filings.- Consequently, financial disclosure has not become
a vehicle for revealing misconduct; rather, misconduct appears to have
occasioned the only concern about lapses in disclosure. Although
further information on enforcement of financial disclosure laws is
beyond the scope of this study, an inquiry into how effectively financial
disclosure laws are enforced and what is necessary to ensure compliance is certainly an area for further research.
VIII.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General Observations
Our review of the various disclosure rules and statutes convinces
us that many, if not most, are the product of fairly random and hasty
drafting. While a few states have succeeded in establishing comprehensive systems, there are simply too many inconsistencies and lacunae
in most jurisdictions to suggest that the provisions have really been
subjected to functional analysis. Functional analysis is not complex.
The purpose of disclosure is to reveal and inhibit real conflicts of
interests, as well as certain prohibited conduct. To achieve this end,
reporting requirements must be understandable, accessible, and nonevadable. Finally, from the judges' point of view, they must not be
unduly burdensome or inflexible. Some might add that the requirements should not be overly invasive or personal, but we believe that
the decision to require disclosure necessarily relegates privacy interests to a secondary status.

290. Maryland, which adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, has incorporated its
prior rule into its Code of Judicial Conduct, Maryland Rules R1231 and R1233. Wisconsin has
not yet adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, but is considering doing so. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the legislation violated state separation of powers doctrine.
291. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that state public officers' legislation violated
the separation of powers doctrine, see Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 503 Pa. 358, 469 A.2d
593 (1983). Promulgation of a rule and accompanying forms by the supreme court followed the
decision.
292. The new Hawaii reporting provision requires the chief clerk of the state supreme court
to '"make reasonable efforts to monitor the filing of statements." HAw.Sup. CT. R. 15(b)(2).
No reports will be filed under this rule, however, until April 30, 1989.
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Tested against these standards, most disclosure laws and rules fall
short in one area or another. Some solutions are obvious. There is no
reason for any jurisdiction to maintain conflicting or ambiguous requirements. Commonly used general terms such as "compensation"
ought to be defined with more precision. States should make greater
use of well-drafted reporting forms.
B. Specifw Recommendations
In addition to these general observations, we also offer the following specific recommendations.
1. Family Members
The Code of Judicial Conduct, and the great majority of jurisdictions, require that disclosure be made concerning all of the members
of a judge's immediate family. In many jurisdictions, however, the
extent of this requirement is either limited or unclear. The Code itself
appears to call for disclosure of certain gifts to a judge's spouse, but
not of compensation. Some jurisdictions exempt family members from
reporting gifts, real estate, equities or other assets.
We recommend that all such spousal or familial exemptions be
abolished, and that a single set of reporting requirements apply equally
regarding judges and their immediate families. Any other approach
at worst invites concealment, and at best allows for undisclosed conflicts of interest. Such a requirement, of course, is that the judge
disclose the family's assets and interests. Thus, no problem exists
regarding jurisdiction to compel disclosure by non-judges. Since most
judges are already required to inform themselves of the assets of their
immediate families for the purpose of disqualification, reporting presents no new burden.
On the other hand, the disclosure laws must address the problem
of the reluctant spouse. If a judge's spouse refuses to divulge to the
judge his or her assets, then the judge is incapable of making full
disclosure. Under these circumstances the judge should be required
minimally to (1) report the inability to comply, (2) state the reasons
for non-compliance, and (3) make as full a disclosure as possible.
2. Hardship
A rule similar to the reluctant spouse proposal should be adopted
in cases where disclosure may work a hardship on judge or family. A
judge who hears criminal cases, for example, may be hesitant to disclose her place of residence. Under these circumstances the judge
should be allowed to withhold information upon the filing of a statement
that (1) identifies by category the information being withheld, and (2)
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sets forth a compelling reason for nondisclosure. Contrary to the apparent practice in virtually every jurisdiction, such statements should
be reviewed, evaluated, and ruled upon.
3. Income, Assets, and Trusts
Far too many jurisdictions utilize definitions or requirements that
fail to capture the full scope of a judge's potential business and financial
activities. In part this is due to the unfortunate use of the vague term
"compensation" in the Code of Judicial Conduct, and in part this is
due to the failure to recognize that non-income producing business
activities can also cause conflicts of interest.
Comprehensive disclosure of financial information requires reporting all income, assets, positions and relationships, and other forms of
beneficial ownership. Thus, judges should be required to disclose, for
themselves and their families, the sources and amounts of all non-judicial income, including salaries, dividends, interest, residuals, royalties, rents, and proceeds. Disclosure should include the identification
of all assets, save personal effects, whether income generating or not,
including real property, leaseholds, stocks, bonds, funds, equities, accounts, certificates, instruments of indebtedness, mineral rights, options, futures, and partnerships. In addition, reporting should include
all positions and relationships with business or non-business organizations, including directorships, offices, trusteeships, or service as an
agent or advisor. Finally, it should be made explicit that disclosure
extends to indirect ownership in the form of estates, trusts, or other
beneficial interests, as well as to service as a fiduciary.
4. Minimums and Exemptions
The use of triggering amounts should be restricted or abolished.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires disqualification from cases
where judges have financial interests "however small," and the disclosure laws should reflect this concern. While respect for privacy may
dictate use of exemptions or minimums for certain personal activities
such as intra-family gifts and small consumer loans, under no circumstances should disclosure of even de minimis income or assets be
excused.
5.

Public Access

Effective disclosure implies public disclosure. In those rare cases
where disclosure may be harmful, the problem should be dealt with
through specific provisions for relief, such as allowing the judge to
object to public disclosure by showing good cause. Otherwise, public
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access should be unimpeded and states should abolish provisions requiring that judges be informed of examination of their reports.
6. Enforcement and Monitoring
If disclosure requirements are to be meaningful in substance as
well as in form, they must be enforced. Ideally each jurisdiction should
audit disclosure forms as they come due, both for timely filing and
substantive compliance. Thus, judges who fail to file, or file incomplete
forms, can be notified expeditiously and requested to comply. Perhaps
this sort of regular administrative monitoring can address problems
before they ripen into disciplinary proceedings.
C. Conclusion
Financial disclosure requirements for judges are all relatively new
and many provisions have not been amended since they were first
enacted. No systematic attention has been paid to these rules. We
hope that this study can form the basis of some needed reform and
redrafting.
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APPENDIX I
Citations to Governing Provisions
AL

Ala. Code §§ 36-25-1 to -30 (1977 & Supp. 1986)
Ala. Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 6

AK

Alaska Stat. §§ 39.50.010-.200 (1987)
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-541 to -545 (1985)

AR

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-3001 to -3007 (1979)
Ark. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

CA

Cal. Gov't Code §§ 81000-91015 (West 1987)

CO

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-6-201 to -202 (1982)
Colo. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

CT

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-46a (1985 & Supp. 1987)
Conn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c)

DE

Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §§ 5811-5816 (1983 & Supp. 1984)
Del. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

DC

D.C. Code Ann. § 11-1530 (1981)
D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

FL

Fla. Const. art. II, § 8
Fla. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

GA

Ga. Code Ann. §§ 21-5-50 to -53 (Harrison 1987)
Ga. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

HI

Order Adding Rule 15 to the Rules of the Supreme Court of
the State of Hawaii (Jan. 21, 1988)

ID

None

IL

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, para. 601-101 to 604A-107
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
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Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 11OA, para. 68 and accompanying
Administrative Order (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
IN

Ind. Code Ann. § 33-2.1-8-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1987)
Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

IA

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

KS

Kan. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

KY

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 61-710 to -780 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986)
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 61-782 to -790 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986)

LA

None

ME

Me. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

MD

Md. Ann. Code art. 40A, § 4-105 (1986)
Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1233

MA

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 286B, §§ 1-8 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp.
1987)
Mass. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

MI

Mich. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

MN

Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

MS

Miss. Code. Ann. §§ 25-4-1 to -31 (1987)
Miss. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(3)(c) and Canon 6

MO

Mo. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(3)(c)

NE

Neb. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

NV

Nev. Rev. Stat. §8 281.561-.581 (1986)
Nev. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(5)(c) and Canon 6

NH

N.H. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

NJ

Memorandum from Robert D. Lipscher to New Jersey Judges
(July 12, 1982)
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NM

N.M. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6

NY

N.Y. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6
N.Y. Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts
§§ 100.5(c)(3)(iii) and 100.6

NC

N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

ND

N.D. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

OH

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 102.01-.99 (Baldwin 1984)
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

OK

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, §§ 4200-4248.1 (West 1987)
Okla. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

OR

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 244.010-390 (1985)
Or. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6

PA

In re Financial Disclosure and Reporting Requirements for
Judicial Officers, No. 47 (Apr. 13, 1984)

RI

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 36-14-1 to -19 (1984)

SC

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-13-10 to -1020 (Law. Co-op. 1986)
S.C. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

SD

S.D. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

TN

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-50-501 to -505 (1980)
Tenn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

TX

Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-9b §§ 1-15 (Vernon Supp. 1987)
Tex. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6

US

28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309 (1982)
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

UT

None

VT

Vt. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6
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VA

Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-599 to -634 (1983 & Supp. 1986)
Va. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6

WA

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 42.17.010 to .945 (Supp. 1987)
Wash. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

W

W. Va. Code §§ 6B-1-1 to -3 (1987)
W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6

WI

Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 19.41-.59 (West Supp. 1986)
Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 60.18

WY

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5C(4)(c) and Canon 6
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APPENDIX II
(State)
*FINANCIAL INFORMATION SURVEY

Disclosure
required

For amounts greater than
*Use the space below if
necessary

Income sources
(generally)
Insurance policies
Real/personal
property interest
Securities/dividends,
rents, capital gains
Trust income
Liabilities and loans
Gifts or honoraria
Expense reimbursement
Most recent income
tax return
Former economic
interests/prior
clients
Spouse business/income
Dependent business/
income

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/1
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Official relationships
with professional
organizations
Fiduciary position
Partnerships
Pending litigation

The following questions relate to the nature, rather than the content,
of the required disclosures.
Is disclosure public, confidential, or limited to requests from litigants?

When were the disclosure requirements last changed or amended?

Frequency of disclosure
Information

Date due

filed with

Penalties for not filing

Statutes and/or Canons applicable

Additional comments___________________
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Name and phone number of person preparing this survey

PLEASE RETURN WITH COPIES OF APPLICABLE STATUTES
AND/OR CANONS BY JULY 14, 1986 TO:
Michael Antonello, Research Assistant
c/o American Judicature Society
25 East Washington, Suite 1699
Chicago, Illinois 60602
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TABLE 1
AUTHORITY FOR FILING
Supreme
Court
Rule
Other
Statute
Than Statute Applying
Code of Code of Applying Only
State
Order of
Judicial Judicial To Public To
ConstiNo
State Court
State Conduct Conduct Officials Judges tution Disclosure Administrator
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
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TABLE 1 (continued)
AUTHORITY FOR FILING
Supreme
Court
Rule
Statute
Other
Than Statute Applying
Order of
State
Code of Code of Applying Only
State Court
No
ConstiJudicial Judicial To Public To
State Conduct Conduct Officials Judges tution Disclosure Administrator
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
x
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
x
X
X

X
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TABLE 2
DISCLOSURE APPLIES TO

State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK

Part-Time
Candidates
Pro-Tem
For
Full-Time Retired
Judicial
Judges Judges* Spouses** Dependents**
Office
Other
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Y
x
Y
Y
x
x
x
x
Y
Y
x
x
Y
Y
x
x
Y
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
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TABLE 2 (continued)
DISCLOSURE APPLIES TO

State
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Part-Time
Pro-Tem
Full-Time Retired
Judges Judges* Spouses** Dependents**
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

Candidates
For
Judicial
Office
Other

X
X
X
Y

X
X
X
Y

X

X
X
Y

X
X
Y

X
X

Y
X
X
Y
X

Y
X
X
Y
X

X

The differences in requirements for reporting by pro-tern, part-time and
retired judges are too detailed to reflect every variation on the table.
Those states not marked on the table are those where no reporting is
required and those using the language of the Compliance Section of the
Model Code exempting part-time, pro-tem and "retired judges except a
retired judge on the court from which he is retired and eligible for recall
to judicial service."
Those jurisdictions marked with X are those which by rule or statute
require disclosure by either part-time, pro-tem or retired judges or some
combination of the three.
Specific state by state variations not identified on this table are explained
more fully in footnote 37.
**

States marked with X are those where disclosure requirements for judges
and family members are basically the same. States marked with Y are
those where some disclosure is required of family members but the
disclosure is different than that of judges. States not marked are those
where required disclosure is unclear or where no disclosure is required
of family members. Specific variations not reflected on the table are
discussed in footnotes 43-45.
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TABLE 3
STATEMENT FILED WITH
State
Court
AdminisState trator
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK

X

Public
Ethics
Commission

Judicial
Secre- County
Conduct
tary
or Local
Organi- Supreme
of
City Court
zation
Court State Clerk Clerk Other

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

Y
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X
Y

X

X

X
X
X

X
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TABLE 3 (continued)
STATEMENT FILED WITH
State
Court
AdminisState trator

Public
Ethics
Commission

Secre- County
Judicial
tary
or Local
Conduct
City Court
of
Organi- Supreme
State Clerk Clerk Other
zation Court

OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
VT
WI
WY

X

X
X

X

Y Those states requiring filing in multiple places or filing in a single place
by multiple provisions.
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State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA

TABLE 4
FREQUENCY/TIME OF FILING *
Upon
Upon Becoming
Appointment
Candidate
Annually
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
Y
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Y
x
x
x
x
x
x
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TABLE 4 (continued)
FREQUENCY/TIME OF FILING *
State

Annually

RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Y
X
X

Upon Becoming
Candidate

Upon
Appointment

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

Other

X

X

*Y Jurisdictions marked with Y are those requiring two reports on two
different dates.
*Z Jurisdictions marked with Z are those requiring a report every other
year.
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TABLE 6
ACTIVITIES/PROPERTY
ProfesTrusts
Businesses
sional and (Beneficial
(Officer, OwnerDirector,
ship HouseCharitable
or
(Official Fiduciary
Shareof Real hold
State Position) Interest) Partnerships holder) Property Effects Other
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
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TABLE 6 (continued)
ACTIVITIES/PROPERTY
Businesses
Trusts
Profes(Officer, Ownersional and (Beneficial
ship HouseDirector,
or
Charitable
of Real hold
Share(Official Fiduciary
State Position) Interest) Partnerships holder) Property Effects Other
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
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TABLE 8
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK

All
Information

Conflicts Only
Upon Request

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
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TABLE 8 (continued)
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

State
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
US
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

All
Information

Conflicts Only
Upon Request

Judge's Income
not
Spouse or
Dependents

Other

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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